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Abstract
Three Essays on Financial and Trade Integration
Elena Bondarenko
This dissertation consists of three essays on financial and trade integration. Financial
and trade integration are the processes though which a country’s financial and com-
modities markets become more integrated with those in other countries. The first essay
addresses the determinants of financial integration, the second essay examines the con-
tribution of financial and trade integration to the convergence in marginal products of
capital, the third essay accesses the effect of international trade in physical capital on
economic growth.
The first essay addresses the empirical question of whether international financial
flows are responsive to capital account restrictions or liberalization policies. The effect
of capital controls on financial flows differs across countries and types of financial flows
(FDI, portfolio equity, and debt). Capital controls are found to be effective for all
types of international capital flows in developed countries. However, short-term volatile
flows are not responsive to capital controls in developing countries. Capital controls
can be an effective policy tool in developed countries with liberalized international
trade and adequate reserves. Policies in developing countries should facilitate FDI
flows and restrict non-productive short-term equity or debt flows in order to maintain
macroeconomic stability and lower the probability of a crisis.
The second essay examines the determinants of convergence in the marginal prod-
uct of capital. The essays derives an empirical model from Solow’s growth model and
augment it to include global factors of financial flows and capital embodied in com-
modity trade. The marginal products of capital converges, however, this convergence is
conditional upon country- specific variables such as reproducible capital share. Saving
rates, foreign direct investment, and international trade are essential determinants of
this conditional convergence. There is no evidence that debt financial flows reduce the
global difference in the marginal product of capital. International trade also contributes
to this convergence by equalizing international prices of investment and consumption
goods.
The final essay estimates the effects of inflows of foreign physical capital on the
output per capita growth. The essay uses an open economy extension of a neoclassical
growth model to include the share of foreign physical capital in domestic investment.
Inflows of machinery and capital equipment reinforce a positive growth in output per
worker. Non-industrial (non-OECD) countries that rely on foreign high-quality capital
grow faster. The findings suggest that policies should facilitate trade liberalization
in developing countries and strengthen the domestic ability to absorb technological
benefits from abroad.
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1Chapter 1
Do Capital Controls Matter for
Financial Integration?
1.1 Introduction
The term ’financial integration’ originated three decades ago, when several OECD
countries and some developing nations started moving from financial repression towards
financial liberalization by relaxing controls on national capital accounts.1 Financial re-
pression was characterized by fixed exchange rate regime, high reserve requirements,
interest rate ceilings, and controls on capital flows in an effort to maintain financial sta-
bility. Such economies did not allow for efficient capital allocation , which higher capital
flows flowing towards countries with higher interest rates. As a result, many countries
experienced low growth, macroeconomic instability, and high costs to maintain regu-
lations.2 The reasoning behind financial liberalization was to reduce costs related to
maintaining fixed exchange rate and promote proper allocation of savings to produc-
tive investment, thus decreasing the effect of externalities caused by the regime. Many
high-income OECD countries liberalized their financial systems during the 1980s, while
1See for instance Kose et al. (2009) on the evolution of international financial integration.
2See Johnston and Tamirisa (1998); Caprio et al. (2001) for more discussion on the characteristics
and effects of financial repression.
Chapter 1. Do Capital Controls Matter for Financial Integration? 2
developing countries started the liberalization only in early 1990s and some emerging
market economies just recently started liberalizing their capital accounts (IMF, 2007;
OECD).
The empirical evidence on the effects of capital controls liberalization policy is
mixed. A growing body of literature finds efficiency gains from capital account liber-
alization in developed countries in terms of economic growth, financial development,
portfolio diversification, and reduction of the cost of capital.3 On the contrary, there is
an empirical support for emerging market economies that experience increased macroe-
conomic volatility and current account unbalances due to increased capital mobility.4
Therefore, some emerging countries reverse the trend toward the liberalization and im-
pose controls on capital accounts. While previous studies focus primarily on the effects
of financial liberalization and integration, the impact of capital controls on actual fi-
nancial flows has not been the object of systematic econometric investigation so far.
This paper addresses the empirical question of whether international financial flows
are responsive to capital account restrictions or liberalization policies across countries
with a different economic development level, and therefore, questions the practicality
of capital controls as a policy tool.
I specify the importance of examining various components of total financial flows
since factors influencing each type cross-border financial flows may be different. Many
studies argue about the importance of studying disaggregated financial flows since
they have different macroeconomic effects and benefits of financial globalization (e.g.
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2007; Aizenman and Noy, 2009). While FDI flows exhibit stability,
portfolio equity, bank loans and debt flows appear to be volatile bearing greater risk
3Chinn and Ito (2006) show that financial openness leads to equity market development. Ito (2006)
reconfirmed this finding for Asian region. Leahy (2001) documented the benefits of financial openness
for OECD countries, noting that capital account liberalization leads to the development of financial
markets.
4See for instance Dell’Ariccia et al. (2007). Stiglitz (2002) argues that capital market liberalization
is not followed by growth, but lead to greater economic volatility and risks in developing countries.
Edwards (2009) concludes that relaxing capital controls increase the probability of a sudden stop.
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for economic activity (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). FDI is determined by long-term
fundamental economic characteristics and thus more stable relative to other compo-
nents of capital account, portfolio and short-term debt flows, called in the literature
’mobile capital’ or ’hot money’ (Rajan, 2002). FDI intensifies the productive ability
of the host country and creates the necessary revenue to cover future capital outflows.
That is why emerging countries that are more vulnerable to sudden stops and cur-
rency crisis tend to have higher share of short-term external debt and smaller share of
FDI in aggregated capital flows (Frankel and Rose, 1996). The disaggregation of finan-
cial flows thus provides more detailed information about possible channels of financial
integration and potential risks associated with them.
The paper involves three disaggregated measures of financial openness: FDI, port-
folio equity and debt flows. I examine whether an increase in FDI and portfolio eq-
uity flows is more likely to occur in liberalized financial systems, while debt flows are
more likely to prevail in financially closed economies, after controlling for domestic
factors that play a significant role in the financial liberalization process. The liter-
ature suggests to take into account persistent country characteristics like openness
to trade, level of economic development, and balance of payments environment when
policy decisions are made regarding financial openness strategies (Aizenman and Noy
(2009), Chinn and Ito (2006), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2007), Johnston and Tamirisa (1998),
Leblang (1997)). I consider four country groups according to their economic develop-
ment level: high-income (OECD and non-OECD), middle income, low income countries
and a full sample. The analysis allows to differentiate the responsiveness of financial
flows to capital controls policies among country groups with similar financial market
characteristics. I employ trade openness, real GDP per capita and total reserves in
months of imports as fundamental factors contributing to international capital mobil-
ity. I develop a data set of 129 countries for the period from 1970 to 2004.
The empirical evidence suggests that impact of capital account restrictions differs
across country groups and types of financial flows. While capital controls are more
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likely to be effective towards all types of international capital flows in high-income
countries, they have an insignificant impact for FDI and equity flows in low-income
countries. The results are consistent with the prominent studies that investigate the
effectiveness of capital controls in selected countries.5 Low-income countries can be
financially integrated in the presence of capital controls or, vice-versa, countries with
liberalized capital accounts are not necessarily financially integrated. The important
issue to understand is why some economies attain higher level of financial integration
while maintaining high levels of controls on capital account transactions. This paper
suggest that the effectiveness of capital controls can explain the discrepancy between
the policy and actual financial flows. Understanding the accompanying determinants of
financial openness is critical in creating an appropriate direction for the capital controls
policies so that their effectiveness and benefits can be maximized.
1.2 Data Sources, Description and Statistics
The panel data is based on annual observation for 129 countries over the period 1970-
2004, splitting the sample in three income groups. Countries are listed in the Table 1.1.
Income groups are classified according to World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI) country classifications. Actual cross-border financial flows are defined in the
literature as de-facto financial openness. I obtain the data on the de-facto financial
openness from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), who constructed the dataset on gross
liabilities and assets positions for 145 nations over the 1970-2004 period. The gross de-
facto financial openness is the sum of assets and liabilities of portfolio equity, FDI, debt,
financial derivatives and total reserves minus gold, which represent both, international
5Vlades-Prieto and Soto (1998) Cardenas and Barrera (1997), and Bush and Hanschel (2000) con-
duct country studies for Chile and Colombia, and Slovenia, correspondingly, and find that find controls
are ineffective in achieving their objectives. Aizenman and Noy (2009) investigate the effect of capital
account restrictions on aggregate financial flows across developing countries and argue that capital
controls have only a weak impact on the level of cross-border financial flows.
Chapter 1. Do Capital Controls Matter for Financial Integration? 5
transactions and holdings between a country’s residents and nonresidents.6 I use the
sum of assets and liabilities as a percentage to GDP to capture total and individual
cross-border financial flows. Gross flows, in general, argued to provide a less volatile
and more sensible picture of financial openness, and do not tend to have measurement
error when used as a ratio to GDP (Kose et al., 2009).
To account for capital controls, I use the index, KAOPEN, developed by Chinn and Ito
(2008) that measures the openness or restrictions to capital account transactions.7 The
index is constructed based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and capture the intensity of administrative restric-
tions on cross-border capital flows. KAOPEN represents the first principal component
of four IMF binary variables: existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on cur-
rent account transaction, restriction on capital account transactions, and requirements
of the surrender of export proceeds, therefore referring to the existence of different types
of restrictions. The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, from full control to complete liberal-
ization correspondingly. Measure of legal restrictions on cross-border capital flows are
referred in the literature as de-jure financial openness.
While the de-jure financial openness reflects a country’s decision to open its econ-
omy to international financial capital flows, the de-facto measure shows the degree of
the stock market integration and capitalization as a result of interaction between the
implementation of capital account restrictions and market forces. Figure 1.1 depicts
6See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Thus, portfolio inflows refer to foreign investors’ purchases of
domestically issued equity in a company. They include the sum of country funds, depository receipts,
and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors. Portfolio equity holdings measure ownership of
shares of companies and mutual funds that are below 10% threshold level. FDI refers to direct invest-
ment in a domestic company, including controlling stakes in addition to 10% Greenfield investment
(minority stakes). Debt category includes debt securities, bank loans and deposits, and other debt
instruments. Thus, debt inflow includes foreign investors’ purchases of debt issued by corporate or the
government, and also foreign borrowing undertaken by domestic banks. Financial derivatives refer to
the market value of the outstanding derivatives contracts.
7Chinn and Ito (2008) by constructing the capital account openness index, provided the compara-
tive illustration of financial openness of most countries around the world. They note that the majority
of the developed industrial countries have high level of financial liberalization; developing and emerg-
ing markets have less capital account liberalization implying that countries experiencing significant
restrictions on financial flows.
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the evolution of financial openness and offers insights into how capital account lib-
eralization and financial integration differ across countries. The general trend across
countries suggests increasing financial integration over the period 1970 to 2004, how-
ever figures generally do not point to causality from de-jure restrictions to de-facto
financial flows.8 High-income countries have been experiencing significant growth in
both de-jure and de-facto openness measures, becoming more financially liberalized and
integrated over time. Middle-income countries have been removing their restrictions
on capital account transaction, having de-jure measure raised substantially, however
have not experienced much growth in actual financial flows. In low-income countries,
de-jure financial openness has remained almost the same, indicating the presence of
strong capital controls policies, while actual flows experienced moderate growth, by
a level greater than in middle-income countries in absolute terms.9 This evidence is
consistent with Kose et al. (2009) who note that Latin American countries have ex-
perienced an increasing average volume of actual cross-border financial flows over the
past two decades despite having a high level of capital account restrictions. In contrast,
some African countries have few restrictions on capital account transactions, but do
not attract significant cross-border capital flows.
I consider three fundamental factors that determine a country’s level of financial
openness, its ability to reduce capital controls and to benefit from financial integra-
tion with minimal risks for its economy: trade openness, economic development level
and international reserves. The data is obtained from the World Bank Development
Indicators Database. The trade openness index is constructed as the sum of imports
and exports (percentage of GDP); gross international reserves in months of imports
are given as a ratio of gross international reserves to the current U.S. dollar value of
imports of goods and services, multiplied by 12. Gross international reserves consists
8Trend analysis determine that the global movements of financial flows exhibit increasing trend
over time, with the highest trend in high-income countries.
9Kose et al. (2009) describe similar pattern of financial openness, using IMF binary 0-1 capital
account restrictiveness classification, where 1 represent countries that have open capital accounts.
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of monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), the reserve position of member with
the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities.
Per capita GDP in constant 2000 US dollars defines the economic development level.
The data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of about 4515 observations. Table
1.2 reports summary statistics for the variables of interest in 1970 and 2004. Interna-
tional financial and trade flows are included as shares of GDP. In 1970, the lowest and
the highest values of gross de-facto financial flows are in Iran (0.03) and Malta (4.90),
correspondingly. In 2005, Bahrain (19.16) obtains the highest gross de-facto financial
flows, while Belarus (0.39) maintain the lowest financial flows across all countries. A
number of low-income countries report zero financial flows in 1970, therefore the mini-
mum level of disaggregated financial flows (FDI, portfolio equity and debt) in 1970 are
assumed to be zero. The highest levels of FDI, portfolio equity and debt are reported
in Panama (1.15), Netherlands (0.27) and United Arab Emirates (4.81), correspond-
ingly. The United States, Japan and a number of high-income countries maintain the
highest degree of financial liberation (2.53) in 1970 and 2005. The highest restrictions
on capital accounts are found in Colombia (-1.81) in 1970 and in Zimbabwe (-1.81) and
other low-income countries. Overall, the summary statistics suggest that high-income
countries are financially liberalized and integrated. Low-income and middle-income
countries maintain conservative financial openness.
Table 1.3 reports correlations among variables of interest. All coefficients have
the expected signs. Correlations between capital controls and international financial
flows are positive and imply that the less domestic financial markets are restricted,
the more they are integrated into international financial market. Positive correlations
between trade openness and de-facto financial openness suggest that increase in inter-
national commodity markets promote higher cross-border financial flows. Total reserves
in months of imports tend to be higher when domestic capital controls are lower, that
is when de-jure financial openness index is higher, and when GDP per capita is higher.
Typically, the GDP level is higher in financially open economies: GDP per capita cor-
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relates positively with de-jure and de-facto financial openness. FDI and equity flows
are influenced by de-jure restrictions more compared to debt flows. Table 1.4 reports
the correlations between de-jure and de-facto financial openness in different country
groups. The relationship between legal restrictions on capital accounts and actual fi-
nancial flows are strong, positive and significant in high-income and middle-income
countries across the majority of financial flows. However, the relationship is weaker
and insignificant in low-income countries. This evidence signals that financial flows
may be not responsive to capital controls in low-income countries.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Empirical Specification
I aim to empirically examine whether legal restrictions on the capital account have
an effect on cross-border financial flows. The following log-linear specification is con-
sidered:
ln(DeFactoXi,t) = β1ln(DeJurei,t) + β2ln(TRADEi,t) + β3ln(PCGGPi,t) +
+β4ln(TRMIi,t) + ξt + ηi + ǫit (1.1)
where the dependent variable, DeFacto, is a measure of gross financial flows for country
i at the time t of the flow type X (total flows, FDI, portfolio equity, and debt as shares
of GDP); DeJure is a capital controls index; TRADE is trade openness (a share of
GDP), TRMI is total reserves in months of imports; PCGGP is per capital GDP. ξt
represents the time fixed effect, ηi accounts for the country-fixed effect or unobserved
factors, such as institutions and resources. ǫit is a time-varying error term.
By estimating equation 1.1, the paper aims to answer which subcomponent of fi-
nancial flows is responsive to a greater degree of capital account restrictions. I expect
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a positive relationship between de-facto financial flows and de-jure financial openness.
Lower restrictions on capital account should lead to a higher level of cross-border fi-
nancial flows and visa-versa.
1.3.2 Estimation Results
I start estimation of the equation (1.1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
including time dummy variables. The results are reported in Table (1.5). The table
contains the estimates for different income group countries. There is positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 1% condifidence level relationship between different types of
de-facto financial flows and de-jure financial openness in full sample. The relationship
is strong in high-income countries. A 1% increase in de-jure financial openness is asso-
ciated with a 0.35% increase in aggregated de-facto financial openness, a 0.41% increase
in FDI flows, a 0.55% increase in portfolio equity flows, and a 0.33% increase in debt
flows. Positive and statistically significant coefficient on capital account restrictions for
debt flows may imply the willingness and ability of advanced economies to serve as a
lender to developing countries. In middle-income countries, the relationship between
capital controls and financial flows are weaker and less significant. A 1% increase in
de-jure financial openness leads to a 0.06% increase in FDI flows and a 0.09% increase
in debt flows. The coefficient on equity flows is negative and insignificant.
In low-income countries, the coefficients on the de-jure financial openness is negative
and statistically significant for aggregate flows, portfolio equity and debt flows: a 1%
increase in the capital controls index is associated with a 0.09%, 0.66% and a 0.11%
decrease in aggregate flows, equity and debt flows, correspondingly. It is worth noting
that financial liberalization may have different effects on various parts of the capital
accounts in different countries. A negative coefficient of de-jure financial openness in
equity and debt equations can be explained by countries’ preferences to become less
dependent on volatile flows including foreign loans as they liberalize their financial mar-
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kets. As countries become more integrated into international financial markets, they
reduce the level of foreign loans, or visa-versa, as countries impose more restrictions
on capital account transactions, they rely more on foreign loans. FDI flows appear
not to be responsive to capital controls: the coefficient on de-jure controls is positive,
but insignificant. Overall, the OLS results confirm the hypothesis and suggest that
international financial flows are responsive to national capital account policies in de-
veloped countries. Financial flows appear to be less responsive to the capital controls
in middle- and low-income countries. However, OLS estimates can be biased due to
the correlation between the country specific fixed effect and explanatory variables.
Next, I estimate the equation (1.1) by least squared dummy variables (LSDV) esti-
mator including time- and country-specific dummy variables. The estimator is robust
given the presence of heteroscedastic and contemporaneously cross-country correlated
disturbances. It reduces the measurement error and omitted variables bias. Table (1.6)
reports the results. In high-income countries, FDI, equity and debt flows are responsive
to capital account policies. A 1% increase in de-jure financial openness is associated
with a 0.18% increase in aggregated de-facto financial openness, a 0.16% increase in
FDI flows, a 0.22% increase in equity, and a 0.18% increase in debt flows. In comparison
to corresponding OLS results, the responce of financial flows to regulations on capital
and current account are lower. In middle-income countries, the coefficients on de-jure
capital controls are positive and statistically significant for FDI and equity flows. A
1% increase in capital account index implies a 0.05% increase in FDI flows and a 0.16%
increase in equity flows. However, the coefficients on aggregate financial flows and debt
flows are negative. Similar to OLS results, the magnitutes of de-jure coefficients are
lower in middle-income countries compared to high-income countries. In low-income
countries, while the coefficient on the de-jure financial openness is insignificant for FDI
and equity flows, it is negative and statistically significant for debt flows. A 1% increase
in the capital account index leads to a 0.09 % decrease in debt flows. A negative and
significant coefficient on de-jure financial openness in the aggregate de-facto openness
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equation may be influenced by the debt and equity flows. It is not a surprising re-
sult given that the share of debt flows in gross assets and liabilities remains very high
for low-income countries. The coefficients on de-jure controls exhibit similar values to
coefficients obtained by OLS in all equations exept for equity equiation.
Further, I employ an alternative data set by transforming the original panel data
set into seven non-overlapping five-year averages.10 The transformation filters out busi-
ness cycle fluctuations, and allows to examine long-run growth effects. I estimate the
equation (1.1) by OLS and LSDV. The results are statistically significant and quali-
tatively similar to the results obtained using the non-transformed data. The results
derived by LSDV estimator are reported in Table (1.7). Coefficients on the de-jure fi-
nancial openness in FDI and equity equations are positive and statistically significant in
high-income, middle-income countries and in full sample. However, de-jure coefficients
in de-facto and debt equations are negative in middle-income, low-income countries
and in full sample. FDI and equity flows appear not to be responsive to capital con-
trols in low-income countries, despite high levels of capital controls. The empirical
evidence suggests that capital controls matter for financial integration in high- and
middle-income countries.
The OLS and LSDV estimates are robust to alternative econometric specification
and sample selection. I perform several robustness checks. First, I test the sensitiv-
ity of the de-jure coefficients across all countries and types of financial flows. The
coefficients are statistically significant and consistent. Next, I test the hypothesis of
joint importance of explanatory variables for the financial integration. I examine in-
teraction terms between de-jure financial openness and international trade, per capita
GDP and total reserves in months of imports. The results show that international
trade and economic development level reinforce the relationship between de-jure and
de-facto financial openness across all countries. Total reserves in months of imports do
10It is standard in the literature to transform panel data, especially the one that contains volatile
financial flows, into five-year averages. See for instance Aghion et al. (2009).
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not have significant influence jointly with de-jure financial openness on financial inte-
gration in high and middle-income countries, however have a significant effect in low-
income countries. Further, I consider dynamic model specification by including lagged
dependent variable, thus the dependent variable is a function of its own past values.
I employ the two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) for five-year non-overlapping averages data.11 GMM esti-
mators are designed to cope with problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
The GMM estimator eliminates any endogeneity that may be due to the correlation
between country specific effects and regressors. Moreover, GMM estimator differences
model variables and that removes time-invariant country specific variable. All right-
hand side variables are treated as endogenous variables and lagged level of endogenous
variables are used as instruments. The specification tests reveal that the errors are not
serially correlated and the instruments are exogenous. The results obtained by GMM
estimator are consistent with the main results and robust to minor model modifica-
tions. While capital controls matter for international financial integration in high-and
middle-income countries, they appear less relevant in low-income economies.
Across all models, the results show a positive and significant effect of international
trade on financial integration across all countries. Trade openness provides greater
potential for financial liberalization and promotes productive FDI flows that should
help an economy to serve its debt (Kose et al., 2009). The results are consistent with
the findings of Blonigen (2001), Aizenman (2008) and Aizenman and Noy (2006) who
argue that international trade and foreign direct investment are positively associated.
The level of economic development and total reserves in months of imports have a
significant and economically meaningful effect on cross-border financial flows. Countries
with higher GDP per capita tend to be more financially integrated than those with lower
levels of GDP per capita and thus, higher levels of debt flows. The effect of development
11The Arellano-Bond estimator is suitable for a relatively short time dimension T, and a larger
country dimension, N. In all subsamples, the conditions N>T is satisfied.
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level of a country on international financial integration is generally stronger in advanced
economies and weaker in developing countries, with the effect being positive for equity
investment. In low-income countries, however, per capital GDP is negatively related
to debt flows, suggesting that countries will reduce the level of foreign debt obligations
when economic development conditions improves. Furthermore, reserves in months
of imports have negative and significant coefficients for most financial flows across all
groups of countries implying that the reduction in foreign reserves is associated with
the growth in cross-border financial flows.
1.4 Conclusion
World financial markets have grown rapidly over the past three decades, engaging
more countries-participants with liberalized capital accounts in international financial
operations. The results are consistent with the notion that advanced economies be-
come more liberalized and integrated into global financial markets, while emerging
market economies continue to maintain conservative capital controls. The analysis pre-
sented in this paper suggests that there are some common factors that can explain
the pattern of financial integration, but individual country circumstances may vary.
Factors like openness to trade, international reserves, and economic development level
strengthen a country’s ability to manage international capital flows and benefit from
financial integration. However, capital account restrictions have mixed effects on finan-
cial integration across different groups of countries. The degree of legal enforcement
of capital controls matter for the level of financial integration in advanced countries,
however controls have an insignificant effect on de-facto financial openness in devel-
oping countries. Large capital flows in the presence of restrictions on capital account
transactions may imply that agents in some countries attempt to circumvent capital
controls, since capital restrictions may deny individuals the opportunity to carry out
profitable transactions.
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Many studies stress the necessity to address policy implications when analyzing the
importance of capital controls and effects of financial liberalization. While the main
objective of the paper is to offer empirical evidence, some general principles emerge
from the analysis about how countries can increase benefits from financial openness. A
country can benefit by accessing the effectiveness of controls on international financial
flows, especially volatile and risky portfolio equity and debt flows. Effective capital
account controls should restrict large outflows of capital, prevent nominal currency
depreciation, lower nonproductive, short-term capital inflows and generally reduce the
probability of a financial crisis. On the contrary, financial flows that are not responsive
to capital account restrictions can result in large fluctuations in international reserves
and interest rates. Thus, by reconsidering controls on capital transactions, that is pro-
moting FDI and restricting equity or debt flows, a country can be more prepared to
manage large international financial flows and avoid negative consequences of financial
liberalization. Capital controls can be an effective policy tool in countries with liberal-
ized international trade, a high economic development level and adequate reserves.
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1.5 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Country List by Income Group
Country WB Code IFS Code Country WB Code IFS Code
High Income OECD Countries
Australia AUS 193 Japan JPN 158
Austria AUT 122 Korea, Rep. KOR 542
Belgium BEL 124 Netherlands NLD 138
Canada CAN 156 New Zealand NZL 196
Denmark DNK 128 Norway NOR 142
Finland FIN 172 Portugal PRT 182
France FRA 132 Spain ESP 184
Germany DEU 134 Sweden SWE 144
Greece GRC 174 Switzerland CHE 146
Iceland ISL 176 United Kingdom GBR 112
Ireland IRL 178 United States USA 111
Italy ITA 136
High Income non-OECD Countries
Bahrain BHR 419 Qatar QAT 453
Cyprus CYP 423 Saudi Arabia SAU 456
Hong Kong, China HKG 532 Singapore SGP 576
Israel ISR 436 Slovenia SVN 961
Kuwait KWT 443 United Arab Emirates ARE 466
Malta MLT 181
Upper Middle Income Countries
Argentina ARG 213 Malaysia MYS 548
Botswana BWA 616 Mauritius MUS 684
Chile CHL 228 Mexico MEX 273
Costa Rica CRI 238 Oman OMN 449
Croatia HRV 960 Panama PAN 283
Czech Republic CZE 935 Poland POL 964
Estonia EST 939 Slovak Republic SVK 936
Gabon GAB 646 South Africa ZAF 199
Hungary HUN 944 Trinidad and Tobago TTO 369
Latvia LVA 941 Turkey TUR 186
Lebanon LBN 446 Uruguay URY 298
Libya LBY 672 Venezuela, RB VEN 299
Lithuania LTU 946
Lower Middle Income Countries
Albania ALB 914 Honduras HND 268
Continued on next page
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Table 1.1: (continued)
Country WB Code IFS Code Country WB Code IFS Code
Algeria DZA 612 Indonesia IDN 536
Angola AGO 614 Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN 429
Armenia ARM 911 Jamaica JAM 343
Azerbaijan AZE 912 Jordan JOR 439
Belarus BLR 913 Morocco MAR 686
Bolivia BOL 218 Namibia NAM 728
Brazil BRA 223 Paraguay PRY 288
Bulgaria BGR 918 Peru PER 293
China CHN 924 Philippines PHL 566
Colombia COL 233 Romania ROM 968
Dominican Republic DOM 243 Sri Lanka LKA 524
Ecuador ECU 248 Swaziland SWZ 734
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 469 Syrian Arab Republic SYR 463
El Salvador SLV 253 Thailand THA 578
Fiji FJI 819 Tunisia TUN 744
Guatemala GTM 258 Ukraine UKR 926
Low Income Countries
Bangladesh BGD 513 Mozambique MOZ 688
Benin BEN 638 Myanmar MMR 518
Burkina Faso BFA 748 Nepal NPL 558
Cote d’Ivoire CIV 662 Nicaragua NIC 278
Cameroon CMR 622 Niger NER 692
Chad TCD 628 Nigeria NGA 694
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 636 Pakistan PAK 564
Congo, Rep. COG 634 Papua New Guinea PNG 853
Ethiopia ETH 644 Rwanda RWA 714
Ghana GHA 652 Senegal SEN 722
Guinea GIN 656 Sudan SDN 732
Haiti HTI 263 Tanzania TZA 738
India IND 534 Togo TGO 742
Kenya KEN 664 Uganda UGA 746
Madagascar MDG 674 Vietnam VNM 582
Malawi MWI 676 Yemen, Rep. YEM 474
Mali MLI 678 Zambia ZMB 754
Moldova MDA 921 Zimbabwe ZWE 698
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year: 1970
De-Facto Openness (%, GDP) 0.63 0.66 0.03 (Iran) 4.90 (Malta)
FDI (%, GDP) 0.13 0.18 - 1.15 (Panama)
Portfolio Equity (%, GDP) 0.01 0.04 - 0.27 (Netherlands)
Debt (%, GDP) 0.46 0.69 - 4.81 (United Arab Emirates)
De-Jure Openness -0.39 1.28 -1.81 (Colombia) 2.53 (United States)
Trade (%, GDP) 0.51 0.30 0.05 (China) 1.79 (Hong Kong)
Real GDP per capita ($US, 2000=100) 4460.34 6446.50 121.60 (Malawi) 39795.04 (Kuwait)
Total Reserves in Months of Imports 2.62 1.22 0.99 (Dominican Republic) 4.91 (Austria)
Year:2004
De-Facto Openness (%, GDP) 2.49 3.00 0.39 (Belarus) 19.16 (Bahrain)
FDI (%, GDP) 0.53 0.63 0.02 (Iran) 5.20 (Hong Kong)
Portfolio Equity (%, GDP) 0.25 0.59 - 5.06 (Ireland)
Debt (%, GDP) 1.50 2.12 0.21 (India) 17.10 (Bahrain)
De-Jure Openness 0.77 1.62 -1.81 (Zimbabwe) 2.53 (Japan)
Trade (%, GDP) 0.89 0.55 0.25 (United States) 4.33 (Singapore)
Real GDP per capita ($US, 2000=100) 7487.89 10150.56 88.02 (Congo) 39352.70 (Norway)
Total Reserves in Months of Imports 4.43 3.53 0.18 (Ireland) 24.87 (Libya)
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Table 1.3: Correlation Matrix
De-Facto FDI Equity Debt De-Jure Trade PCGDP TRMI
De-Facto Openness (%, GDP) 1
FDI (%, GDP) 0.479 1
Portfolio Equity (%, GDP) 0.439 0.544 1
Debt (%, GDP) 0.977 0.304 0.283 1
De-Jure Openness 0.344 0.336 0.333 0.287 1
Trade (%, GDP) 0.503 0.577 0.297 0.415 0.268 1
Real GDP per capita ($US, 2000=100) 0.251 0.307 0.483 0.175 0.588 0.145 1
Total Reserves in Months of Imports -0.026 -0.040 0.002 -0.061 0.019 -0.019 0.032 1
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Table 1.4: Correlation between De-jure and De-facto Financial Openness
Full sample Hign Income Middle Income Low Income
De-Facto Openness (%, GDP) 0.3443 0.3149 0.3179 0.013
FDI (%, GDP) 0.3362 0.3300 0.2297 0.1095
Portfolio Equity (%, GDP) 0.3330 0.3339 0.0043 -0.0582
Debt (%, GDP) 0.2875 0.2658 0.2717 -0.0229
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Table 1.5: De-Facto Conditional to De-jure and Domestic Factors, OLS (T=35)
(time- and country-fixed effects, robust standard errors)
All Countries High-Income Countries
ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t) ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t)
ln(DeJurei,t) β1 0.064*** 0.104*** 0.072 0.062*** 0.357*** 0.415*** 0.558*** 0.333***
(std error) (0.013) (0.026) (0.058) (0.014) (0.038) (0.046) (0.094) (0.043)
ln(Tradei,t) β2 0.643*** 0.782*** 0.553*** 0.553*** 1.048*** 0.635*** 0.605*** 1.101***
(std error) (0.022) (0.028) (0.067) (0.026) (0.038) (0.048) (0.066) (0.047)
ln(PCGDPi,t) β3 0.088*** 0.162*** 0.888*** 0.068*** 0.027 0.108 1.007*** 0.028
(std error) (0.006) (0.012) (0.033) (0.007) (0.050) (0.083) (0.117) (0.054)
ln(TRMIi,t) β4 -0.054*** -0.079*** -0.063 -0.140*** -0.046 -0.226*** -0.242*** -0.083***
(std error) (0.012) (0.017) (0.044) (0.014) (0.028) (0.047) (0.078) (0.032)
Constant 1.211*** -1.237*** -8.564*** 1.596*** 0.000 0.175 -9.516*** -0.523
(0.156) (0.275) (0.634) (0.192) (0.567) (1.047) (1.297) (0.613)
Obs. 2,967 2,903 1,893 2,967 894 864 778 894
Adj. R-squares 0.532 0.467 0.439 0.389 0.692 0.566 0.552 0.618
Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t) ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t)
ln(DeJurei,t) β1 0.060*** 0.063* -0.105 0.094*** -0.091*** 0.031 -0.663*** -0.114***
(std error) (0.016) (0.033) (0.074) (0.018) (0.026) (0.043) (0.221) (0.029)
ln(Tradei,t) β2 0.458*** 0.721*** 0.675*** 0.217*** 0.805*** 1.345*** 1.245*** 0.717***
(std error) (0.023) (0.052) (0.116) (0.029) (0.037) (0.054) (0.227) (0.043)
ln(PCGDPi,t) β3 0.111*** 0.312*** 0.828*** 0.018 -0.076* 0.178*** -0.322 -0.107**
(std error) (0.018) (0.035) (0.088) (0.023) (0.041) (0.058) (0.252) (0.048)
ln(TRMIi,t) β4 -0.010 -0.046 0.442*** -0.168*** -0.060*** 0.021 -0.136 -0.132***
(std error) (0.024) (0.037) (0.086) (0.028) (0.016) (0.027) (0.099) (0.018)
Constant 1.508*** -1.839*** -8.957*** 3.254*** 1.443*** -3.490*** -4.840** 1.632***
(0.199) (0.496) (1.051) (0.299) (0.337) (0.442) (2.025) (0.389)
Obs. 1,266 1,255 780 1,266 807 784 335 807
Adj. R-squares 0.436 0.327 0.198 0.276 0.647 0.563 0.0865 0.583
C
h
a
p
ter
1
.
D
o
C
a
p
ita
l
C
o
n
tro
ls
M
a
tter
fo
r
F
in
a
n
cia
l
In
teg
ra
tio
n
?
21
Table 1.6: De-Facto Conditional to De-jure and Domestic Factors, LSDV (T=35)
(LSDV, time- and country-fixed effects, robust standard errors)
All Countries High-Income Countries
ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t) ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t)
ln(DeJurei,t) β1 -0.027*** 0.063*** 0.175*** -0.057*** 0.180*** 0.163*** 0.221*** 0.179***
(std error) (0.010) (0.015) (0.035) (0.011) (0.023) (0.031) (0.057) (0.025)
ln(Tradei,t) β2 0.562*** 0.545*** 0.592*** 0.539*** 1.199*** 0.719*** 1.216*** 0.937***
(std error) (0.038) (0.047) (0.113) (0.042) (0.103) (0.114) (0.204) (0.113)
ln(PCGDPi,t) β3 -0.068 0.362*** 0.926*** -0.313*** -0.149 0.155 1.054*** -0.142
(std error) (0.043) (0.063) (0.128) (0.048) (0.107) (0.134) (0.244) (0.121)
ln(TRMIi,t) β4 -0.044*** 0.043*** 0.073** -0.127*** -0.008 0.048* 0.306*** -0.144***
(std error) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) (0.012) (0.024) (0.029) (0.056) (0.026)
Constant 3.072*** -2.666*** -10.053*** 5.380*** 1.618 -1.401 -14.405*** 2.386**
(0.430) (0.626) (1.277) (0.481) (1.041) (1.364) (2.238) (1.142)
Obs. 2,967 2,903 1,893 2,967 894 864 778 894
Adj. R-squares 0.853 0.867 0.891 0.837 0.916 0.908 0.894 0.901
Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t) ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t)
ln(DeJurei,t) β1 -0.025** 0.055*** 0.167*** -0.050*** -0.084*** 0.022 0.171 -0.098***
(std error) (0.011) (0.020) (0.047) (0.012) (0.020) (0.036) (0.142) (0.022)
ln(Tradei,t) β2 0.522*** 0.607*** 0.355** 0.484*** 0.718*** 0.647*** 0.326 0.711***
(std error) (0.042) (0.080) (0.159) (0.047) (0.059) (0.063) (0.463) (0.064)
ln(PCGDPi,t) β3 0.094* 0.272** 0.421** -0.151** -0.521*** 0.246** 1.273*** -0.660***
(std error) (0.056) (0.118) (0.206) (0.065) (0.071) (0.111) (0.415) (0.083)
ln(TRMIi,t) β4 0.019 0.097*** 0.303*** -0.108*** 0.021 0.067*** -0.130* -0.032**
(std error) (0.018) (0.035) (0.082) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.073) (0.014)
Constant 1.533*** -2.423*** -7.251*** 2.507*** 3.693*** -1.589** -12.138*** 4.252***
(0.358) (0.884) (1.696) (0.437) (0.483) (0.670) (2.164) (0.566)
Obs. 1,266 1,255 780 1,266 807 784 335 807
Adj. R-squares 0.819 0.831 0.855 0.800 0.875 0.875 0.782 0.860
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Table 1.7: De-Facto Conditional to De-jure and Domestic Factors, LSDV (T=7)
(LSDV, time- and country-fixed effects, robust standard errors)
All Countries High-Income Countries
ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t) ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t)
ln(DeJurei,t) β1 -0.024 0.138*** 0.324*** -0.069** 0.269*** 0.258*** 0.263** 0.277***
(std error) (0.026) (0.047) (0.109) (0.029) (0.073) (0.095) (0.128) (0.083)
ln(Tradei,t) β2 0.515*** 0.645*** 0.345 0.502*** 1.377*** 0.834*** 1.135** 1.049***
(std error) (0.079) (0.116) (0.287) (0.093) (0.258) (0.304) (0.567) (0.300)
ln(PCGDPi,t) β3 -0.035 0.334** 0.820*** -0.295*** -0.265 0.183 1.121* -0.260
(std error) (0.100) (0.153) (0.311) (0.112) (0.239) (0.247) (0.647) (0.288)
ln(TRMIi,t) β4 -0.078*** 0.034 0.214** -0.164*** -0.005 0.062 0.431*** -0.158**
(std error) (0.027) (0.038) (0.100) (0.030) (0.058) (0.074) (0.156) (0.064)
Constant 2.991*** -2.911** -10.160*** 5.485*** 2.127 -2.405 -16.115** 3.288
(0.963) (1.473) (3.004) (1.076) (2.200) (2.438) (6.284) (2.575)
Obs. 646 631 425 646 185 179 163 185
Adj. R-squares 0.850 0.829 0.887 0.834 0.915 0.904 0.877 0.895
Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries
ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t) ln(DeFactoi,t) ln(FDIi,t) ln(Equityi,t) ln(Debti,t)
ln(DeJurei,t) β1 -0.021 0.143** 0.412*** -0.066* -0.123** 0.046 0.429 -0.146***
(std error) (0.030) (0.062) (0.145) (0.034) (0.049) (0.099) (0.415) (0.054)
ln(Tradei,t) β2 0.404*** 0.740*** -0.060 0.338*** 0.736*** 0.755*** 1.172 0.749***
(std error) (0.089) (0.189) (0.406) (0.102) (0.109) (0.153) (1.065) (0.127)
ln(PCGDPi,t) β3 0.269** 0.272 0.401 0.034 -0.462*** 0.172 1.744 -0.553***
(std error) (0.108) (0.296) (0.391) (0.123) (0.158) (0.278) (1.442) (0.183)
ln(TRMIi,t) β4 -0.022 0.082 0.818*** -0.175*** -0.001 0.094 -0.134 -0.054
(std error) (0.048) (0.087) (0.248) (0.055) (0.032) (0.057) (0.211) (0.033)
Constant 1.318* -1.446 -11.207*** 4.312*** 2.874*** -3.278* -18.896*** 3.072***
(0.795) (1.613) (3.389) (0.969) (1.005) (1.868) (5.004) (1.157)
Obs. 279 276 178 279 182 176 84 182
Adj. R-squares 0.815 0.744 0.881 0.795 0.887 0.864 0.785 0.880
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(a) All Countries. (b) High Income Countries.
(c) Middle Income Countries. (d) Low-income Countries.
Figure 1.1: Evolution of Financial Integration: 1970-2004
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Chapter 2
Determinants of Convergence in the
Marginal Product of Capital
2.1 Introduction
Whether or not the world capital stock is allocated proportionally to developing
countries is fundamental to understanding global differences in economic development.
One of the basic economic measures used to explore this question is the marginal prod-
uct of capital (MPK), which is equal to capital return when production technology
exhibits constant returns to scale and commodity and factor markets are perfectly
competitive. Conventional wisdom suggests that the marginal product of capital con-
verges across countries if the financial market effectively allocates worldwide production
capital. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that MPKs do indeed converge across coun-
tries, but that convergence is conditional upon international differences in shares of
reproducible capital and relative prices of final-to-investment goods.
Caselli and Feyrer’s evidence regarding conditional convergence does not immedi-
ately support the conventional wisdom of a perfect financial market. The Solow growth
model (Solow, 1956, 1957), for example, predicts that poor countries will catch up with
rich countries in terms of capital returns and per capita gross domestic product (GDP).
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In fact, the long-run convergence process of MPK can be identical to that of economic
growth (Mankiw et al., 1992; Caselli et al., 1996) if countries lack access to the global
financial market. A country that opens its financial market will receive foreign capital
if its capital return is higher than foreign countries’ returns. The global flows of finan-
cial capital from low- to high-return countries promote MPK convergence if financial
capital is transformed to reproducible capital. Although financial flows are likely to
be a primary global factor, we cannot ignore the roles played by international trade
and production specialization in conditional convergence. As in Stolper and Samuelson
(1941) and Samuelson (1949), convergence in product prices due to freer trade causes
convergence in factor prices. International trade leads countries to specialize in the pro-
duction of comparative advantage goods, creating upward pressure on prices of factors
used intensively in the production process. Capital returns in capital-scarce developing
countries would decline because of trade liberalization.
This paper examines both domestic and international factors as potential deter-
minants of this conditional convergence. We first develop an empirical model from
Solow’s growth model (Mankiw et al., 1992) and augment it to include international
factors of finance and trade. We are particularly interested in comparing the contribu-
tions of domestic and international factors for MPK convergence. We use a measure
of MPK from Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and develop a data set of 52 countries from
1970 to 2005. The data confirm evidence for MPK convergence over the period we con-
sider (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007; Mello, 2009; Chatterjee and Naknoi, 2010, e.g.). The
cross-country standard deviation had declined significantly from 0.048 in year 1970 to
0.028 in year 2005. We use a two-step difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond,
1991) and estimate the determinants for MPK convergence. Saving rates, aggregate
financial flows, and international trade are found to be essential determinants of con-
ditional convergence. Although domestic factors appear to contribute more than inter-
national factors, the results depend on econometric specifications. We also investigate
the components of financial flows responsible for the findings in aggregate financial
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flows. Although FDI flows are effectively associated with MPK convergence, debt flows
do not strongly reduce the global difference in MPK. One possible explanation is that
financial flows without ownership do not effectively convert into recipient countries’
reproducible capital stock. Finally, the literature has ignored findings in international
trade. However, it is not surprising that international trade plays a role in conditional
convergence. We show that international trade contributes to the convergence by equal-
izing relative final-to-investment prices worldwide. We believe that these results are
consistent with the conflicting evidence shown in previous literature. Although finan-
cial capital, the majority of which consists of debt flows, appears not to flow strongly
from low- to high-return countries (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980; Lucas, 1990), eco-
nomic factors other than financial flows contribute to the conditional convergence of
MPK (Mankiw et al., 1992; Caselli et al., 1996).
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. In Section 2, we present
an empirical measure of MPK and its convergence trend. In Section 3, we develop
an empirical strategy by deriving MPK from Solow’s model and augmenting it with
international finance and trade factors. Section 4 presents empirical results. We discuss
our conclusions in the last section.
2.2 Marginal Product of Capital
2.2.1 Measures of MPK
We derive empirical measures of the marginal product of capital from the Cobb-
Douglas production function. We assume the following: there is an aggregate produc-
tion sector, there are two factor inputs, and product and factor markets are perfectly
competitive. We consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function, in which
output is linked to the two factor inputs of capital and effective labor:
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Yit = K
αi
it (AitLit)
1−αi
where Yit is the output of country i at time t, Kit is the reproducible capital, Lit is
labor, and Ait is labor augmenting productivity. The shares of capital and labor in
national income are represented by αi and 1 − αi, which are time invariant but differ
across countries. Because capital in agricultural and natural-resource sectors is non-
reproducible, it should not be a part of a country’s physical capital stock. Following
Caselli and Feyrer (2007), we use the non-reproducible capital share for αi.
To employ the constant return to scale (CRS) production technology, we make
two additional assumptions. The first one states that the economy is large enough
to increase the output once factor inputs are increased. The second one specifies the
relative unimportance of land and other natural resources in production.1 Under these
assumptions and perfectly competitive markets of goods and factors, the compensation
for one unit of physical capital (rit) is equal to MPKit:
MPKit = αi
Yit
Kit
(2.1)
Throughout this paper, we focus on presenting empirical results from this measure
of MPK.2
1If natural resources were important, the production function would not be CRS since the increase
in capital and labor would deliver a less than proportional increase in output.
2Caselli and Feyrer (2007) label equation (2.1) naive, arguing that it is biased because it does not
account for the difference in investment prices between rich and poor economies. However, we continue
to use the measure of MPK from equation 2.1 since the price adjustment will be canceled when we
solve MPK from the Solow model.
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2.2.2 Data
We compile a benchmark data set containing 52 countries3 over a period from
1970 to 2007. The country sample is restricted by the availability of the reproducible
capital share in income (αi). Caselli and Feyrer (2007) build an estimate of αi from
Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2002) and the World Bank.4 Since the data are available
only for 1996, we assume the data to be constant over time.
To develop MPKit, the data on Yit is derived from the Penn World Table 7.0
(Heston et al., 2011). Yit is real GDP in constant 2005 international dollars. The
capital stock, Kit, is developed from the perpetual inventory method using the data on
real aggregate investment:
Kit = (1− δ)Ki,t−1 + Iit
where δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital and Iit is real investment. Following
Caselli and Feyrer (2007), we use the depreciation rate of 6%. To obtain the initial
value of the real capital stock, we compute:
Ki,1961 =
Ii,1961
δ + gˆi
where gˆi is the average growth rate of real investment in country i over the period from
1961 to 1981. Although we use the real investment data starting from 1961, the capital
352 countries are Algeria (DZA), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Bolivia (BOL),
Botswana (BWA), Burundi (BDI), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Congo (COG),
Costa Rica (CRI), Cote d‘Ivoire (CIV), Denmark (DNK), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), El Sal-
vador (SLV), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA),
Jamaica (JAM), Japan (JPN), Jordan (JOR), Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Mauritius (MUS), Mex-
ico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), the Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Panama
(PAN), Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Portugal (PRT), Singapore (SGP), South
Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sri Lanka (LKA), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Trinidad &To-
bago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), the United Kingdom (GBR), the United States (USA), Uruguay (URY),
Venezuela (VEN), and Zambia (ZMB).
4The World Bank publication ’Where is The Wealth of Nations’ provides estimates of the wealth
components, including natural capital.
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stock measures used in the empirical analysis are from 1970 to 2007.
We can deconstruct MPKit from equation (2.1) into the capital share αi and cap-
ital productivity Yit/Kit. Because αi is time invariant, the growth rate of MPK,
∆ ln(MPKit), is associated only with the growth rate of capital productivity. The
summary statistics of MPK and capital productivity for 1970 and 2005 are reported in
Table 1. In 1970, the lowest and highest values of MPK were Ecuador (0.022) and El
Salvador (0.240), respectively. The difference between these two countries is roughly
tenfold. Most high-income countries are in the middle range: 0.092 for France, 0.112
for the United States, and 0.136 for Japan. The MPK measures from 1970 indicate
significant dispersion, deriving mainly from low-income countries. In 2005, the country
with the lowest MPK value was Burundi (0.023), with El Savador continuing to hold
the highest MPK value (0.164). Although the ratio of the lowest to the highest MPK
remains significant (approximately sevenfold), the cross-country standard deviation de-
clines significantly from 0.046 to 0.024.
2.2.3 Overview of MPK Convergence
To understand the convergence process of MPK across countries and years, we study
two measures of convergence: sigma (σ) and beta (β).5 σ-convergence is a measure of
dispersion from the sample mean, which incorporates the standard deviations of n
countries’ MPK measures in each year. If dispersion from a sample mean declines over
time, there is evidence for cross-country σ-convergence. Figure 1 shows the long-run
trend of dispersion in MPK from 1970 to 2007. In 1970, the standard deviation across
52 countries was the largest. There was a sharp drop over the period from 1970 to
1985, followed by a period of relative stability.
β-convergence examines the relationship between the growth rates over the period τ
against the initial levels across countries. If MPK converges over time across countries,
5See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) for the discussion on σ- and β-
convergence in neoclassical growth model.
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β in the following equation would be negative:
ln(MPKit)− ln(MPKi,t−τ ) = φ+ β ln(MPKi,t−τ ) + ǫi
This type of convergence is referred to as catching-up convergence. Figure 2 reports
β-convergence when t=2005 and τ=35. The average growth rates in MPK are found
to be negatively and statistically significantly associated with the initial values. We
find that the β coefficient is −0.51, indicating β-type convergence: the higher the
initial values, the higher the subsequent declining rates. The corresponding speed of
convergence is around 2% per year. It implies that the average time an MPK spends
to cover half of the distance between its initial position and its steady-state is about
36 years. Both figures show a tendency for dispersion of MPK to decline over time,
suggesting the presence of a long run equalization mechanism in the marginal product
of capital.
2.3 Theory for MPK Convergence
2.3.1 Domestic Factors
We wish to examine the economic factors causing the convergence in MPK. We
start by considering domestic factors likely to play critical roles in MPK convergence.
Our theoretical basis is built upon the Solow growth model in Mankiw et al. (1992).
Here, we use Solow’s model as a baseline to associate our discussion with empirical
literature on conditional convergence in economic growth. The Solow model assumes
that a constant fraction of output, si,t−τ , is saved and invested to production process.
The saving rate is defined as the share of real domestic investment to real GDP. We
define kit as the stock of capital per effective unit of labor: kit = Kit/(AitLit), and yit
as the level of output per effective unit of labor: yit = Yit/(AitLit). The evolution of
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kit is then characterized by the following equation:
∆kit = si,t−τyit − (nit + git + δ)kit (2.2)
where nit is the average population growth rate between t−τ to t, and git is the growth
rate of labor productivity from t− τ to t.6
Equation (2.2) implies that kit converges to a steady-state capital to effective labor
ratio:
Kit
AitLit
=
[
si,t−τ
nit + git + δ
] 1
1−αi
(2.3)
Using equations (2.1) and (2.3) , we can derive the marginal product of capital as
the following:
MPKit = αi
[
nit + git + δ
si,t−τ
]
(2.4)
Our equation (2.4) corresponds to equation (17) in Mankiw et al. (1992). The equa-
tion predicts that while the marginal product of capital would be negatively correlated
with the initial saving rate (si,t−τ ), it would be positively correlated with the capital
share (αi), population growth rate (nit), human capital growth (git), and depreciation
rate (δ). Here, we call (nit + git + δ) an effective depreciation rate. This equation
6To obtain labor-augmenting productivity, we first derive it from Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion:
ln(Ait) =
ln(Yit)− αi ln(Kit)− (1− αi) ln(Lit)
(1− αi)
.
We think, however, it is problematic to use Ait derived directly from the function above as a proxy
for a measure of labor-augmenting productivity. Thus, we use the fitted values (Ait) from the following
equation:
ln(Ait) = γ
1
i ln(Edu
1
it) + γ
2
i ln(Edu
2
it) + γ
3
i ln(Edu
3
it) + γ
4
t + εit
where Edu1it, Edu
2
it, and Edu
3
it are the average years of primary schooling, secondary schooling, and
tertiary schooling, respectively, from Barro and Lee (2010). Our empirical measure of git is the growth
rate of Ait from year t− τ to t.
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indicates that these domestic factors would be predictors of the MPK. Taking the log
to both sides of equation (2.4), we derive the following equation (2.5):
ln(MPKit) = ln(αi)− ln(si,t−τ ) + ln(nit + git + δ) (2.5)
Finally, we rewrite equation (2.5) as a growth model in the level of the marginal
product of capital similar to Caselli et al. (1996):
ln(MPKit) = β1 ln(MPKi,t−τ )+β2 ln(αi)+β3 ln(si,t−τ )+β4 ln(nit+git+δ)+ ǫit (2.6)
In equation (2.6), we expect that β1 is in the range between 0 and 1. A value of
β1 closer to zero indicates a greater tendency towards convergence because the average
growth rate, ln(MPKi,t) − ln(MPKi,t−τ ), is inversely related to ln(MPKi,t−τ ). Here,
(β1 − 1) = −(1 − e
−λτ ) should be negative, implying that a country relatively close
to its steady-state MPK value experiences a slowdown in the evolution of MPK. Note
that λ is the convergence rate and the estimate of the speed at which a country’s MPK
converges toward its steady state value.
To seek the potential impact on the conditional convergence of a change in the key
domestic factor (saving rates), we develop a standard deviation in saving rates across
52 countries for each year. Figure 3 reports σ-convergence of saving rates over 38 years.
Interestingly, saving rates diverge initially and converge significantly after 1982. The
decrease in the cross-country variation is partially due to the increase in saving rates
in developing economies.7 An increase in saving rate implies an increase in capital per
worker. Following Solow’s model and discussion by Mankiw et al. (1992), this should
drive capital return down. Convergence in saving rates would result from the reduction
7Loayza et al. (2000) examine a large cross-country and time-series data on national saving. They
find that, on average, gross national saving rate in industrial countries has declined persistently after
1973. The evidence on developing countries is confounding: saving rates in East and South Asia
countries rise, while saving rates in Latin America, the Caribbean, North and Sub-Saharan Africa
regions decline.
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of barriers to capital mobility. In this case, a change in saving rate in one country would
spread across all countries, causing capital returns to equalize across these countries
(Feldstein and Horioka, 1980).
2.3.2 International Flows of Financial Assets
We now turn to the global factors that may cause convergence in MPK. In particular,
international financial flow is believed to be the primary factor that equalizes capital
returns across countries. In the absence of barriers to capital mobility, capital owners
seek more productive opportunities in countries with a high return of capital until
capital returns are equalized worldwide. There could be several reasons that prevent
financial flows from flowing into the countries with high returns of capital. While Lucas
(1990) notes the presence of credit-frictions, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) argue that the
high costs of installing capital in poor countries prevent financial capital from flowing
to them.
We add a measure of international financial flows to the main equation (2.6) to
examine whether financial flows, potentially transformed into reproducible capital, in-
fluence MPK convergence. We construct a ratio of net cross-border financial flows to
nominal GDP. Financial flows are the aggregate of portfolio equity, FDI, debt, and
other financial flows from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).8
Our baseline model is augmented with a measure of net financial flows,
NetF lowi,t−5
GDPi,t−5
:
8Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) provide details on data definitions as well as data development
strategy. International portfolio flows refer to investors’ purchase of issued equity containing country-
funds, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares. Portfolio equity holdings include direct
purchases of shares in local companies and mutual funds that are below 10% of ownership level.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) includes direct investment in a local company to control stakes (above
10% of ownership level) as well as green field investment. The debt category includes debt securities,
bank loans, deposits, and other debt instruments. Other flows include financial derivatives and total
reserves minus gold.
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ln(MPKit) = β1 ln(MPKi,t−5) + β2 ln(αi) + β3 ln(si,t−5)
+β4 ln(nit + git + δ) + β5(NetF lowi,t−5/GDPi,t−5) + ǫit (2.7)
We expect negative relationship between the net financial flows and the MPKs,
as more financial capital in a given country (transformed to the reproducible capital)
should reduce the MPK.
2.3.3 International Trade
While financial flows are likely to be a primary global cause of convergence, we
cannot ignore the role of international trade and production specialization. As in
Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Samuelson (1949), convergence in product prices
due to freer trade causes convergence in factor prices. This concept of factor price
equalization is a well-known theory of international trade.9 International trade causes
countries to specialize in producing their comparative advantage goods, creating upward
(downward) pressure on the prices of factors that are used heavily (lightly) in produc-
tion process. It is intuitively convenient to consider international flows of products
to be embodied factor input flows. For example, a capital-abundant country (Japan)
exports capital-intensive goods (machinery) to a capital-scarce country (Vietnam) and
imports labor-intensive goods (textiles) from Vietnam. Because machinery production
requires more capital and less labor than textile production, Japanese machinery ex-
ports embody more capital and less labor than Japanese textile imports do. In other
words, Japan is a net exporter and Vietnam is a net importer of embodied capital.
9The empirical study of international trade has rejected the FPE theory. See Davis and Weinstein
(2001), who argue that the breakdown of the FPE theory is essential to supporting global production
and trade data. However, Nishioka (2012) finds that the empirical rejection of the FPE theory in
Davis and Weinstein (2001) stems not from capital but from labor. The industry-level measures of
capital productivity, a main component of MPK, are similar across countries and industries from the
2000 data.
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Thus, production specialization causes capital return in Japan to increase and that in
Vietnam to decline, creating the equalization force in capital returns.
International trade arises from global differences in product price. Vietnam has an
incentive to purchase machinery from Japan because Japanese machinery is cheaper
than its Vietnamese counterpart. The intuition behind international trade as a cause
of MPK convergence stems from the declining trend in the log of the relative price:
ln(P yit/P
k
it).
10 Figure 4 provides insight on how international trade can affect MPK
convergence. The figure depicts σ-convergence in the price ratios of final-to-investment
goods for each year and provides evidence that the relative prices are equalized across
countries.
To examine how physical capital embodied in international trade influences returns
to capital across countries, we introduce a measure of capital content of trade according
to Leamer (2000). Our measure is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV)
model Vanek (1968) and is derived from the following equation:11
KCTit = KCEit −KCIit = EXit
Kit
GDPit
−
∑
j∈C52
IMijt
Kjt
GDPjt
where C52 is the subset of 52 countries, EXit is the export value (nominal $US) of
country i to the subset of 52 countries, GDPit is the gross domestic product (nominal
$US) of country i, and IMijt is the bilateral import of country i from country j.
10P
y
it, and P
k
it are derived from the Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011). P
y
it is the price
level of gross domestic product (PPP over GDP), and P kit is the price level of investment (PPP over
investment). See also Hsieh and Klenow (2007) who find that the price of investment goods relative
to consumptions goods tends to be higher in richer countries.
11Typically, the empirical literature on the HOV model employs data from Input-Output Tables
because the primary objective of the HOV model is to examine factor trade arising from industry
composition. However, we develop the measure of capital content of trade similarly to the measure
of R&D content of trade proposed by Lichtenberg and v. Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998). We use
country-specific capital intensity to estimate capital content of trade, omitting capital content of trade
arising from industry composition. Because the subject of this paper is the long-run effect of capital
content of trade for MPK convergence, and because Input-Output Tables are not available for time-
series data, we use the measure used by Lichtenberg and v. Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998). This
measure is also similar to Davis and Weinstein (2001) because there is a small variation in industry-
level measures of Kit/Yit within a country but considerable variation across countries (Nishioka, 2011).
Chapter 2. Determinants of Convergence in the Marginal Product of Capital 36
The HOVmodel predicts that a capital abundant country is an exporter of embodied
capital, and a capital scarce country is an importer of embodied capital. In other words,
a country that exports capital content more than its imports is a net exporter of capital
with a positive measure of KCTit. In our study, the data on bilateral exports and
imports are obtained from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
and the Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF).12
Our model is augmented to include an additional measure: the capital content of
trade divided by the domestic capital stock (KCTi,t−5/Ki,t−5):
ln(MPKit) = β1 ln(MPKi,t−5) + β2 ln(αi) + β3 ln(si,t−5)
+β4 ln(nit + git + δ) + β6(KCTi,t−5/Ki,t−5) + ǫit (2.8)
We expect a negative relationship between the capital content of trade and the
MPK. A capital abundant country is an exporter of KCT it, and the return to capital
is low in a capital abundant country. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 exhibit the scatter plots
of KCTit/Kit against MPKit for 1970 and 2005, respectively. In 1970, there is a
rough but negative association between these two measures. The measures of MPK for
net importers of embodied capital are higher than those for net exporters of embodied
capital. However, the negative relationship is weaker in 2005. The returns to capital are
clustered together within a narrow range, indicating that both measures had equalized
significantly over the period.
12We use nominal values ($US) for exports, imports, and GDP to measure capital content of trade.
We use previously developed measure of capital stock. Because the bilateral trade values of exports
and imports are not available for some years of Botswana (1970-1995) and South Africa (1970-1995),
we use the values from the closest year (2000) to interpolate the data. For example, the unavailable
bilateral imports of year 1995 for Botswana are estimated from the total imports in year 1995 and
bilateral import shares from year 2000.
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2.4 Empirical Evidence
2.4.1 Baseline Results
To study the convergence mechanism of the marginal product of capital, we use
equation (2.6) as a baseline and augment it to include international factors. We are
particularly interested in financial capital flows as in equation (2.7) and embodied
capital flows as in equation (2.8). The data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of
at most 364 observations from 52 countries at 5-year intervals (τ=5) during the period
from 1970 to 2005.
Equation (2.6) represents a dynamic model with a lagged-dependent variable on the
right-hand-side, which gives rise to autocorrelation and other econometric problems
typical of dynamic time-series panel data. In particular, it is critical to account for
endogeneity problems to obtain consistent estimators from equation (2.6). To avoid this
problem, Caselli et al. (1996) introduce the difference generalized method of moments
(difference GMM, Arellano and Bond (1991)) and estimate a cross-country convergence
rate of economic growth. We follow Caselli et al. (1996) and employ difference GMM
as our preferred estimator. It is a good fit for our study because we have a short
time-span (T=8) and a large cross-section (N=52).13 We use the two-step estimator
instead of the one-step because it is asymptotically efficient and robust to panel-specific
autocorrelation, different patterns of heteroskedasticity, and cross-country correlation
(Bond et al., 2001).
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to start estimation of the dynamic equation with
ordinary least squares (OLS). Although the estimators from OLS are biased, the results
provide us with the rough ranges of the true parameters. The problem with applying
13We prefer difference GMM over system GMM. System GMM for our purpose has limitations.
First, only variables that do not correlate with country fixed effects can be included in the model.
Second, system GMM assumes the larger number of instruments than difference GMM do. This limits
the choices for instruments. Finally, in the case when the number of instruments is greater than the
number of countries, the instruments and test for overidentifying restrictions could be weak.
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OLS is that the lagged dependent variable is positively correlated with the fixed effects
in the error term, which gives rise to dynamic panel bias. The coefficient for the lagged
dependent variable (β1) is upward biased because it captures the power that is supposed
to belong to country fixed effects (Hsiao, 1986). This bias results in a downward bias
in the estimate of the speed of convergence: λ (Caselli et al., 1996).
We start our estimation with a simple conditional convergence model that includes
only a lagged dependent variable, denoted as Model 1. Then, Model 2 adds domestic
factors, as shown in equation (2.6). Next, we estimate equation (2.7) as Model 3 and
equation (2.8) as Model 4. Finally, Model 5 augments equation (2.6) by including both
financial and embodied capital flows. We include time dummy variables that have
the same effect as transforming the variables into deviations from time means. They
remove universal time-related shocks from errors, preventing any sort of cross-country
and contemporaneous correlations.
Estimation results from OLS are reported in Table (2.2(a)). The coefficient on the
initial level of the marginal product of capital (β1) in Model 1 is close to one (0.929),
implying that the speed of convergence (λ) is slow (1.5%). In Model 2, β1 declines
from 0.929 to 0.679 and the speed of convergence (λ) increases from 1.5% to 7.7%,
indicating the importance of domestic factors for conditional convergence. The values
of β1 remain stable in the subsequent models. The coefficient on the initial level of
capital share is positively and statistically significantly associated with MPK as the
theory suggests, which confirms that MPK convergence is ’conditional’ upon country-
specific capital shares (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). The saving rate (si,t−5) and effective
depreciation rate (nit + git + δ) have opposite effects in signs. While a 1% increase in
the initial saving rate leads to a 0.21% decrease in MPK, a 1% increase in the effective
depreciation rate leads to a 0.10% increase in MPK. Models 3, 4, and 5 introduce
financial and trade flows. However, only financial flows appear to be correlated with
MPK. Overall, the OLS results indicate that the inclusion of domestic factors improves
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the fit of the regressions14 although the results are subject to econometric problems,
such as endogeneity.
Next, we estimate the five models with the least squares dummy variables (LSDV),
including time- and country-specific dummy variables. Here we need to drop the time-
invariant and country-specific capital share ln(αi) from the equations.
15 The LSDV
estimators do not eliminate dynamic panel bias because the estimators are only consis-
tent when all right-hand side variables are strictly exogenous. The results from LSDV
estimations are reported in Table (2.2(b)). As in Model 1, β1 is 0.619. In compari-
son to the corresponding OLS result, the speed of convergence increases significantly
from 1.5% to 9.6% when we include country-specific fixed effects. MPK convergence is
conditional for country-specific factors, which may include time-invariant reproducible
capital share. Across all models, the coefficients on saving rates (β3) and effective de-
preciation rates (β4)are statistically significant with MPK. However, since our empirical
measures of ln(nit+git+δ) are relatively stable over time, country-specific dummy vari-
ables may capture the cross-country variation in ln(nit + git + δ). The coefficient of
capital content of trade in Model 4 is insignificant but exhibits a greater value than the
corresponding OLS coefficient. When all domestic and global factors are included as in
Model 5, the coefficient of international trade is negative but statistically insignificant.
The financial flow variable is significant in both Models 3 and 5.16
Although the results from OLS and LSDV provide insight regarding the power and
sign of domestic and global factors affecting MPK convergence, these results are subject
to the econometric problems discussed above. Now, we employ a difference GMM
14Adjusted R2 increases from 0.932 (Model 1) to 0.959 (Model 2). However, they do not improve
when we introduce global factors (Models 3, 4, and 5). Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicate that the model that includes only trade flows represents
a better statistical fit (AIC and BIC are not reported).
15The country fixed effect captures time-invariant country-specific determinants of MPK, which
include capital share (αi).
16Adjusted R2 increases from 0.950 (Model 1) to 0.963 (Model 2), however, as in the case of OLS
estimates, they do not improve as we add international factors. AIC and BIC (not reported) indicate
that Models 3 and 5 have the best statistical fit.
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estimator that suits our econometric needs.17 The difference GMM uses equation (2.6)
in first-difference by transforming it into:
∆ ln(MPKit) = β1∆ ln(MPKi,t−5) + β3∆ ln(si,t−5) + β4∆ ln(nit + git + δ) + ξt +∆ǫit
where ξt is a year-specific constant, capturing productivity changes and other factors
common to all countries. Note that first-difference transformation removes country-
specific fixed effects.
We treat all right-hand side variables in the equation above as endogenous variables.
It is logical to consider that domestic variables are endogenous because we derive MPK
from the steady-state condition in equation (2.2). Moreover, international variables
are also endogenous because financial and embodied capital flows arise simultaneously
from the global difference in returns to capital. See, for example, Mundell (1957)
and Antra`s and Caballero (2009) for theoretical consideration of this concept. Lagged
levels of endogenous regressors are used as instruments, including the first-difference
lagged dependent variable. The validity of instruments is determined by the consistency
of parameter estimates and specification tests: the Hansen test for overidentifying
restrictions, difference-in-Hansen tests for exogeneity of instrument subsets, and the
Arellano-Bond (AR) test for first- and second-order serial correlation in differences.
These specification tests indicate that the moment conditions are robust p-values of
AR(2). The Hansen and difference-Hansen statistics signal that errors are not serially
correlated. AR(2), the test for second-order correlation in differences, is important
because it detects autocorrelation in levels. We find no evidence for serial correlation
in levels, suggesting that fluctuations in economic activity do not influence our results.
17Bond et al. (2001) argue that the first-differenced GMM estimator can be a poor estimator of
cross-country growth regressions due to a possible weak correlation of the lagged levels of series with
the subsequent first-differences. We test the correlations and find a strong relationship between the
first-differences and the second lags of the level variables. Therefore, at a minimum, the second lags
of endogenous variables can serve as valid instruments for our purpose.
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The results of GMM estimation and its specification tests are reported in Table
(2.2(c)). The coefficients on the initial level of MPK (β1) in all models are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. The speed of convergence ranges
from 3.1% in Model 1 to 8.6% in Model 3. Averaging all of the models, the speed of
convergence is 6.6%, which is in between the average speeds from the OLS and LSDV
estimations.18
We observe higher convergence rates when financial variables are included (λ is
7.4% for Model 3 and 8.6% for Model 5). The effects of international factors are not
negligible when considering the convergence process of MPK. The coefficients on saving
rates, ln(Si,t−5), and effective depreciation rates, ln(nit + git + δ), are opposite in signs
with similar magnitude. Models 4 and 5 indicate that the capital content of trade is
negatively associated with MPK, and its effect on convergence rates is greater relatively
to the effect of financial variable.19
2.4.2 Robustness Check
We check for robustness of the above results by introducing alternative measures
for financial and trade variables. We continue to employ a two-step difference GMM
estimator. Alternative measures of financial variables are financial openness and disag-
gregated financial flows (FDI and debt flows). We use a measure of financial openness
from Chinn and Ito (2008), who developed the country-level index of restrictions on
18The convergence speed of 6.6% per year implies that the average time a MPK spends to cover
half of the distance between its initial positive and its steady-state is about ten and a half years.
MPK half-life convergence time is similar to GDP per capita half-life convergence life obtained by
Caselli et al. (1996) which is about seven years. The differences in per-capita income levels across
countries can be related to the differences in MPK levels across countries.
19We acknowledge an alternative method that allows to obtain the contribution of each explanatory
variable as proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). According to their method, the mean values
of each variable are combined with the coefficients from estimated regressions to produce ’predicted
values’. Then, comparing predicted and actual measures would indicate the extent to which differences
in international trade or financial flows account for differences in MPK across countries. However, this
method would not allows us to conclude about the effect the explanatory variables have on the MPK
convergence rate across the sample.
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capital mobility.20 Using this measure, we can examine whether a reduction in finan-
cial restrictions explains MPK convergence. By introducing net FDI and debt financial
flows separately, we can study which components of aggregate financial flow are ef-
fectively transformed into physical capital. We intend to compare our results with
those in Chatterjee and Naknoi (2010), who study the frictions in the transformation
of financial capital into physical capital. The data on FDI and debt flows are from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Table 2.3 reports the estimation results for alterna-
tive financial variables. Here, we compare them with the results of Model 3 reported
in Table 2.2(c).
Column 2 in Table 2.3 reports the model with a financial openness variable. The
coefficient on the openness measure is negative, implying that the more a financial mar-
ket is liberalized, the lower its return to capital. However, this coefficient is statistically
insignificant. Column 3 introduces FDI flows. The coefficient is negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 1% confidence level, implying that FDI inflows are likely to be
transformed into physical capital. The coefficient on debt flows is significant (column
4), however lower is value compared to FDI inflows, suggesting that loans or financial
aids have low impact on a country’s capital stock. This finding confirms the argument
in Caselli and Feyrer (2007), who state that increase in aid flows in the absence of
financial repression results in capital outflows. Columns 5 and 6 report the estimations
of Model 3 in Table 2.2(c) at different time periods. The coefficient on total net finan-
cial flows is higher in the period from 1970 to 1995 than in the period from 1985 to
2005. The convergence exhibits higher rate before 1995. These results suggest that the
influence of financial flows in the early periods is stronger than those in later periods.
20This index is developed from IMF’s ’Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER)’ and captures the intensity of regulatory restrictions on cross-border capital
flows. Specifically, it is based on the principal components of four IMF binary variables: (1) existence
of multiple exchange rates, (2) restrictions on current account transactions, (3) restrictions on capital
account transactions, and (4) required surrender of export proceeds. This index represents the exis-
tence of different types of financial restrictions and ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 to represent a spectrum
from full control to complete liberalization. We scaled the index to avoid negative values. Note that
developed countries have higher index values than developing and emerging countries.
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Similar to the results from the financial measures, the results for trade variable from
the period from 1970 to 1995 support stronger relationship between embodied capital
flows and MPK measures.
Alternative measures of international trade include the log of capital content of
imports (KCIit) and the trade openness index. We develop the trade openness index
from the sum of a country’s total imports and exports divided by its GDP. This index
roughly measures the level of trade openness. Table 2.4 reports the results. The coef-
ficients on lagged dependent variables and domestic factors are statistically significant
and have expected signs in all models. In column 2, the coefficient on the log of import
capital content is negative and statistically significant at 1% confidence level. Higher
imports of capital intensive goods has a downward pressure on domestic MPK. Col-
umn 3 reports the results when using the trade openness index. We find a negative and
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% confidence level. A country with greater
openness for trade has a lower MPK value.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examined the economic factors that drive convergence in the marginal
product of capital. We developed our empirical model from Solow’s growth model
(Mankiw et al., 1992) and augmented it to include international factors of finance and
trade. We used a measure of MPK from Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and developed a
data set of 52 countries from 1970 to 2005. Using two-step difference GMM estimators
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), we found that saving rates, FDI flows, and trade flows
are key determinants of conditional convergence of MPK. We found no strong evidence
that debt financial flows reduce the global difference in MPK. One possible explanation
of this result is that financial flows without ownership may not be transformed to
reproducible capital stock. In fact, international trade, measured by capital content of
trade, contributes to the convergence by equalizing international prices of investment
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and consumption goods.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev Min value Max value
Year: 1970
MPK 0.092 0.046 0.022 (Ecuador) 0.240 (El Salvador)
Capital productivity 0.535 0.265 0.186 (Tunisia) 1.896 (Burundi)
Year: 2005
MPK 0.073 0.024 0.023 (Burundi) 0.1645 (El Salvador)
Capital productivity 0.432 0.144 0.2132 (Jordan) 1.031 (Ivory coast)
Note: Relative price is the price ratio of final-to-investment goods (P yit/P
k
it)
We define capital productivity as Yit/Kit.
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Table 2.2: MPK Convergence Conditional to Domestic and International Factors
(a) OLS (ordinary least squares, time-fixed effects, robust standard errors)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Convergence rate λ 1.5% 7.7% 7.1% 7.7% 7.2%
ln(MPKi,t−5) β1 0.929*** 0.679*** 0.700*** 0.681*** 0.696***
(std error) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
ln(αi−5) β2 0.313*** 0.300*** 0.311*** 0.305***
(std error) (0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034)
ln(si,t−5) β3 -0.215*** -0.200*** -0.214*** -0.201***
(std error) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
ln(nit + git + δ) β4 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.097***
(std error) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
NetF lowi,t−5/GDPi,t−5 β5 -0.025** -0.025**
(std error) (0.012) (0.012)
KCTi,t−5/Ki,t−5 β6 0.008 -0.023
(std error) (0.061) (0.063)
Obs. 364 364 355 364 355
Adjusted R-squares. 0.932 0.959 0.956 0.959 0.956
(b) LSDV (least squares dummy variables, time- and country-fixed effects, robust standard
errors)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Convergence rate λ 9.6% 13.2% 12.6% 13.0% 13.0%
ln(MPKi,t−5) β1 0.619*** 0.516*** 0.533*** 0.522*** 0.530***
(std error) (0.043) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039)
ln(si,t−5) β3 -0.179*** -0.152*** -0.176*** -0.154***
(std error) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
ln(nit + git + δ) β4 0.071*** 0.057** 0.071*** 0.057**
(std error) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
NetF lowi,t−5/GDPi,t−5 β5 -0.066*** -0.066***
(std error) (0.022) (0.023)
KCTi,t−5/Ki,t−5 β6 0.039 -0.020
(std error) (0.088) (0.092)
Obs. 364 364 355 364 355
Adjusted R-squares 0.950 0.963 0.962 0.963 0.962
(c) Panel GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991, time-fixed effects, robust standard errors)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Convergence rate λ 3.1% 5.6% 7.4% 8.3% 8.6%
ln(MPKi,t−5) β1 0.858*** 0.757*** 0.690*** 0.660*** 0.652***
(std error) (0.045) (0.072) (0.040) (0.045) (0.027)
ln(si,t−5) β3 -0.091*** -0.117*** -0.129*** -0.104***
(std error) (0.027) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012)
ln(nit + git + δ) β4 0.134*** 0.049 0.108*** 0.040**
(std error) (0.047) (0.036) (0.027) (0.016)
NetF lowi,t−5/GDPi,t−5 β5 -0.084*** -0.073***
(std error) (0.021) (0.007)
KCTi,t−5/Ki,t−5 β6 -0.111** -0.121***
(std error) (0.047) (0.016)
Specification tests (p-values are in parenthesis)
Obs. 312 312 304 312 304
Countries 52 52 51 52 51
# of Instruments 27 33 42 42 51
Hansen J 27.29 26.75 33.93 32.61 42.77
(0.127) (0.316) (0.375) (0.437) (0.353)
Diff. Hansen 15.150 9.060 6.660 2.870 5.840
(0.368) (0.170) (0.353) (0.825) (0.441)
AR(1) -3.89 -3.902 -3.543 -3.685 -3.401
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0007)
AR(2) 0.516 0.728 0.464 0.763 0.481
(0.606) (0.466) (0.643) (0.445) (0.631)
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Table 2.3: Financial Openness and Components of Financial Flows
Financial variable Total (net, %) CA openness FDI (net, %) Debt (net, %) Total (net, %) Total (net, %)
Period (1970-2005) (1970-2005) (1970-2005) (1970-2005) (1970-1995) (1985-2005)
Convergence rate λ 8.6% 3.4% 11.2% 8.3% 15.2% 8.6%
ln(MPKi,t−5) β1 0.652*** 0.845*** 0.570*** 0.660*** 0.468** 0.652***
(std error) (0.026) (0.103) (0.070) (0.032) (0.204) (0.027)
ln(si,t−5) β3 -0.104*** -0.130*** -0.143*** -0.133*** -0.055 -0.104***
(std error) (0.012) (0.040) (0.030) (0.018) (0.097) (0.012)
ln(nit + git + δ) β4 0.040*** 0.148** 0.078* 0.080*** 0.108 0.040**
(std error) (0.015) (0.064) (0.045) (0.017) (0.086) (0.016)
Financial var.i,t−5 β5 -0.073*** -0.027 -0.383*** -0.044*** -0.114** -0.073***
(std error) (0.007) (0.164) (0.095) (0.004) (0.047) (0.007)
KCTi,t−5/Ki,t−5 β6 -0.121*** 0.095** -0.271*** -0.182*** -0.382** -0.121***
(std error) (0.015) (0.046) (0.100) (0.026) (0.156) (0.016)
Specification tests (p-values are in parenthesis)
Obs. 304 295 303 304 202 255
Countries 51 51 51 51 51 51
# of Instruments 51 31 31 51 19 50
Hansen J 42.770 15.970 17.070 46.520 7.525 42.770
(0.353) (0.718) (0.649) (0.222) (0.675) (0.353)
Diff. Hansen 5.840 5.020 5.330 4.000 3.090 5.840
(0.441) (0.542) (0.502) (0.677) (0.543) (0.322)
AR(1) -3.401 -3.610 -2.746 -3.398 -1.957 -3.260
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.050) (0.001)
AR(2) 0.481 -0.644 0.365 0.568 -0.364 0.483
(0.631) (0.520) (0.715) (0.570) (0.716) (0.629)
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Table 2.4: Various measures of trade and trade openness
Trade variable KCTi,t−5/Ki,t−5 ln(KCIi,t−5) Trade Opennessi,t−5
Period (1970-2005) (1970-2005) (1970-2005)
Convergence rate λ 8.6% 11.9% 8.1%
ln(MPKi,t−5) β1 0.652*** 0.552*** 0.666***
(std error) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029)
ln(si,t−5) β3 -0.104*** -0.066*** -0.065***
(std error) (0.012) (0.021) (0.009)
ln(nit + git + δ) β4 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.112***
(std error) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006)
NetF lowi,t−5/GDPi,t−5 β5 -0.073*** -0.130*** -0.087***
(std error) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
Trade variable β6 -0.121*** -0.052*** -0.137***
(std error) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013)
Specification tests (p-values are in parenthesis)
Obs. 304 304 304
Countries 51 51 51
# of Instruments 51 51 51
Hansen J 42.77 43.36 42.33
(0.353) (0.330) (0.371)
Diff. Hansen 5.84 4.52 7.08
(0.441) (0.607) (0.314)
AR(1) -3.401 -3.305 -3.698
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
AR(2) 0.481 0.342 0.441
(0.631) (0.732) (0.659)
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Figure 2.1: Sigma convergence of the marginal product of capital
Figure 2.2: Beta convergence of the marginal product of capital
Chapter 2. Determinants of Convergence in the Marginal Product of Capital 50
Figure 2.3: Standard deviations of the saving rates across 52 countries
Figure 2.4: Standard deviations of the relative prices across 52 countries
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Figure 2.5: MPKit and KCTit/Kit in 1970
Figure 2.6: MPKit and KCTit/Kit in 2005
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Chapter 3
Capital Goods Inflows and
Economic Growth
3.1 Introduction
Inflows of foreign physical capital raise domestic investment and can facilitate pro-
ductivity growth by means of transmission of knowledge and technological advances.1
Therefore, inflows of physical capital can increase domestic production, advance tech-
nical progress in the production of capital and speed up economic growth. Inflows can
be especially beneficial for developing countries that do not raise their savings enough
to increase the rate of domestic capital accumulation and have to rely on international
trade to obtain physical capital. Cross-country studies on economic growth typically
focus on domestic investment to explain output growth.2 However, domestic invest-
1Coe and Helpman (1995) find that foreign R&D capital has beneficial effects on domestic produc-
tivity. Xu and Wang (1999) show that trade in capital goods is a significant channel of R&D spillovers.
Eaton and Kortum (2001) study the effect of trade in capital goods on a country’s productivity, sug-
gesting that developing countries may benefit by importing capital-intensive goods that embody new
technology.
2 Empirical literature find strong empirical support for a relationship between domestic physical
capital accumulation and growth in a cross-section of developing and developed countries. See for
instance Mankiw et al. (1992), DeLong and Summers (1991, 1993), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995),
Caselli et al. (1996), Jones (1997), Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2002), Bond et al. (2010) who use in-
vestment to measure capital accumulation. Baldwin (1966) is the first to point out the necessity to
consider impact of capital-goods trade on the development process.
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ment and foreign capital inflows are tightly linked and the conventional measure of
capital stock does not distinguish between domestic and foreign capital contribution.
Therefore, the measure does not reflect the quality of equipment used in countries.
This paper assesses a contribution of foreign capital to domestic capital investment
and examines the effect of imported physical capital goods in stimulating economic
growth.
I construct Solow’s determinants of growth equations to study the causes of growth
in real GDP per capita. The baseline equation includes domestic growth processes
such as the saving rate, the population growth rate, and labor-augmenting technolog-
ical progress, as discussed in Mankiw et al. (1992) and Caselli et al. (1996). Available
technology and human capital determines the ability to ’absorb’ new capital stock
and benefit from technology transfers (Eaton and Kortum, 2001). The benefits from
physical capital inflows may be small in a country with underdeveloped production
infrastructure or with a poorly educated work force. Domestic factors also control for
the differences in steady states of different countries. To consider an open economy
version, I augment the model with inflows of foreign capital goods as a share of do-
mestic investment. Foreign capital includes machinery, transport equipment and other
production capital.
To empirically examine the contribution of foreign capital goods to economic growth,
I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) and least squares dummy variable (LSDV) es-
timators, similar to Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995). Then, I introduce the
dynamic panel model and follow the empirical methodology proposed by Caselli et al.
(1996) and supported by Shioji (2001) and Bond et al. (2010). They use a differ-
ence General Methods of Moments estimator (GMM) introduced by Arellano and Bond
(1991). The estimation procedure involves first-differencing of the growth regression
that removes country-specific effects, and therefore, the omitted variable bias. Then,
right-hand side variables are instrumented with their lagged values that solves endo-
geneity issue. I employ non-overlapping 5-year period data that allows the reduction
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of the impact of the business cycle fluctuations or occasional shocks, as well as mea-
surement errors.3 I develop a data set of 52 countries for the period from 1970 to 2005,
which includes 24 high-income (OECD) and 28 low to middle income (non-OECD)
countries.
The empirical evidence suggests that a higher share of foreign physical capital in
domestic investment predicts a higher level of output per capita growth. Non-industrial
(non-OECD) countries that rely on imported foreign capital grow faster. Imports of
capital goods contribute to the economic development by providing production op-
portunities and ground for innovations and technological advance. A challenge for
policymakers in developing countries is then to prepare their economies to best absorb
the potential benefits of physical capital inflows in order to generate long-term domestic
benefits, and facilitate trade in capital goods. Industrial (OECD) countries can also
benefit from the trade in capital goods given the cross-country differences in a price of
capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents specifica-
tions of the neoclassical growth model augmented with international capital. Section
3.3 describes the data, the properties of the main variables and discusses a trend in
capital goods trade. Section 3.4 outlines the econometric approach, validity tests and
presents empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Neoclassical Growth Model
Following the discussion and notation in Mankiw et al. (1992), I consider the neo-
classical Cobb-Douglas production function that exhibits constant returns to scale,
positive and diminishing returns to private inputs, and satisfies the Inada conditions:
Yit = K
α
it(AitLit)
(1−α)
3 See Bond et al. (2001) and Bond et al. (2010) for details.
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where Yit is output in country i at the time t, Kit capital, Lit labor, Ait is the level of
technology, and α is a constant with 0 < α < 1. Labor force and technology growth
rates are assumed to be n and g :
Lit = L0e
nt
Ait = A0e
gt
Let sit be the fraction of output that is saved, that is the savings rate. Savings are
invested into physical capital stock, that depreciates at the constant rate δ > 0. Let k
be the stock of capital per effective unit of labor, kit = Kit/AitLit, and y be the level of
output per effective unit of labor, yit = Yit/AitLit. Then the net increase in the stock
of physical capital at a point in time equals gross investment less depreciation given
available level of technology and labor:
∂kit
∂t
= Iit − δkit = sityit − (nit + git + δ)kit
where the term (nit+git+δ) can be thought of as the effective depreciation rate for the
capital-labor ratio, kit = Kit/AitLit. This equation defines the evolution of the capital
stock per effective unit of labor and implies that kit converges to a steady-state value:
k∗it = [
sit
(nit+git+δ)
]
1
1−α
This fundamental equation developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) implies
that the steady-state capital-labor ratio is related positively to the savings rate and
negatively to the effective depreciation rate. To obtain the effect of the savings rate
and the effective depreciation rate on the growth of per capita GDP, the steady-state
condition is substituted into the production function and logs are taken. The following
equation represents the steady-state output per capita condition:
ln[ Yit
AitLit
] = lnA0 + gt+
α
1−α
ln(sit)−
α
1−α
ln(nit + git + δ)
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This model implies that the growth in output per effective labor is positively asso-
ciated with the savings rate and negatively with population growth, the depreciation
rate and technology attainment. The A0 term reflects country-specific levels of tech-
nology, and consists of a constant and a country-specific shock. The model defines the
determinants of economic development level in a closed version economy.
3.2.1 Growth Regression in a Closed Economy
I aim to empirically examine economic factors that cause the growth in real GDP
per worker. First, I consider country domestic factors that play fundamental roles in
the growth process. The growth of output per worker is determined by the savings rate
and effective depreciation rate:
ln(
Yi,t
AitLit
) = β1 ln(si,t) + β2 ln(nit + git + δ) + ξt + ηi + ǫit (3.1)
where ξt represents the time trend, ηi account for the country-specific intercept or
unobserved factors, such as differences in aggregate production functions. It can also
define climate, institutions and resources.4 ǫit is an error term. The equation predicts
that real income growth is higher in countries with a higher savings rate (si,t), and
lower in countries with a lower effective depreciation rate (nit + git + δ).
I relax the theoretical assumption that the included explanatory variables, the sav-
ings rate and the effective depreciation rate, are independent of country-specific factors
affecting the production function. I assume instead that domestic factors correlate with
country-specific factors, that is they are not independent of ηi. This creates omitted
variable bias and estimates obtained with ordinary least squared (OLS) may be biased.
4This country-specific effect correlates with the included explanatory variables that creates omitted
variable bias (Islam, 1995).
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3.2.2 Augmenting the Solow Model with Inflows of Physical
Capital
International trade in capital goods is one of the significant sources for capital
accumulation and productivity growth. To account for the effect of international trade
in capital goods on output growth, I augment the Solow model with the shares of foreign
physical capital goods in domestic investment. This way, I obtain the composition of
new investment which represents foreign capital, knowledge and technology. The data
on international capital goods trade is obtained from UN Comtrade database. The trade
is comprised of the commodities in SITC section 7: nonelectrical machinery, electrical
machinery, apparatus, appliances, and transport equipment. I used a measure of gross
capital formation as a proxy for domestic investment.5 Accessing the share of foreign
capital goods in domestic investment allows to distinguish the quality of production
capital, that is to determine to what extent a country relies on imports of foreign
capital.
The main model is augmented to include the shares of foreign production capital
in gross domestic investments, (KImp/Ii,t):
ln(Yi,t) = β1 ln(si,t) + β2 ln(nit + git + δit) + β3(KImp/I)i,t + ξt + ηi + ǫit (3.2)
I expect a positive relationship between the share of foreign capital goods in do-
mestic investment and economic growth. This would imply that the higher the share
of imported equipment in domestic capital formation leads to the higher growth in real
output per worker. Figures (3.1) and (3.2) depict a scatterplot with the share of cap-
ital imports in domestic investment and real GDP per worker in 1970 and 2005. The
figures show that while some countries import most of their equipment, the majority
5 I use nominal values ($US) for manufactures exports, imports, and gross capital formation to
measure capital trade as a share of domestic investment, as well as net manufactures trade as a share
of domestic investment. The data on gross domestic formation is obtained from WDI.
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of countries rely on domestic producers. This evidence can be due to the existence of
large trade costs and due to the fact that the reported price of equipment is actually
higher in richer countries (Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Hsieh and Klenow, 2007). The
investment share of foreign equipment varies little across countries.6 Figures display a
small, but positive relationship between the share of foreign capital goods in investment
and a country’s development level.
Figure (3.3) plots the share of capital goods exports from the ’Big 6’ over the period
from 1970 to 2005. The group of countries include Canada, France, Japan, Italy, the
United Kingdom and the United States. These capital-intensive countries specialize
in producing and exporting capital goods. The scatterplot shows that the share of
capital goods exports from the ’Big 6’ is about 80% of the total capital exports in 1970
and declines over time. It reaches 61% in 2005. This evidence implies that while big
industrial countries continute to be major suppliers of capital goods, non-industrial
countries may rely less and less on imported capital goods.
3.3 Data
The data set contains 52 countries7 over a period from 1970 to 2005. The data on
Yit, sit, nit comes from the Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011). Yit is real GDP
in constant 2005 international dollars. The saving rate, sit, is defined as the share of
6Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that the investment share that is applied to equipment does not
vary much across countries compared to the equipment production share. They argue that if equipment
investment shares vary a lot, then there would not be a positive relationship between equipment
production and net exports of equipment.
752 countries are Algeria (DZA), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Bolivia (BOL),
Botswana (BWA), Burundi (BDI), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Congo (COG),
Costa Rica (CRI), Cote d‘Ivoire (CIV), Denmark (DNK), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), El Sal-
vador (SLV), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA),
Jamaica (JAM), Japan (JPN), Jordan (JOR), Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Mauritius (MUS), Mex-
ico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), the Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Panama
(PAN), Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Portugal (PRT), Singapore (SGP), South
Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sri Lanka (LKA), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Trinidad &To-
bago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), the United Kingdom (GBR), the United States (USA), Uruguay (URY),
Venezuela (VEN), and Zambia (ZMB).
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real domestic investment to real GDP. The depreciation rate of physical capital, δ, is
assumed to be 6% and constant for all countries in all years. The average population
growth rate, nit, is calculated over t− τ and t. The growth rate of labor productivity,
git, is calculated from the fitted values of (Ait) from the following equation over t − τ
to t:
ln(Ait) = λ
1
i ln(Edu
1
it) + λ
2
i ln(Edu
2
it) + λ
3
i ln(Edu
3
it) + λ
4
t + εit
where Edu1it, Edu
2
it, and Edu
3
it are the average years of primary schooling, secondary
schooling, and tertiary schooling, respectively, from Barro and Lee (2010).
The data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of about 416 observations at 5-year
intervals (τ=5). Table 3.1 displays some basic statistics about output per capita and
physical capita trade variables in 1970 and 2005. In 1970, the lowest and highest values
of real GDP per capita and its growth were in Burundi ($US 354.47) and in Switzerland
($US 25940.07), correspondingly. This shows that Switzerland is about 73 times richer
than Burundi and the growth of its real GDP per capita is twice as high compared
to Burundi’s. In 2005, the country with highest real GDP per capita is Norway ($US
48701.210), while Burundi obtains the lowest value ($US 368.536) again. There is a
high dispersion in income levels due to the insignificant growth of some low-income
countries, which increases over the studied period. Norway is approximately 132 times
richer than Burundi in 2005 in terms of per capita GDP.
Capital trade variables are shares of capital imports in domestic investment, shares
of capital exports in total exports and net trade in capital goods (as a share of domestic
investment). Japan obtains the lowest level of manufactures imports as a share of
domestic investment in 1970 and 2005. Uruguay and Singapore import the highest
amount of capital goods in 1970 and 2005, correspondingly. Ecuador and Panama have
the lowest shares of capital exports in total exports, while the United States maintain
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the highest share of capital exports across all countries in 1970 and 2005. Finally, net
capital goods trade numbers confirm that net-importers of foreign capital are developing
countries (Uruguay and Burundi), and capital producers and net-exports are developed
countries (United Kingdom and Singapore).
3.4 Empirical Evidence
To study economic growth, I employ baseline equation (3.1) and extend it with the
share of imported capital in investment. First, I estimate a closed economy version
of the Solow model that includes only domestic factors, denoted as Model 1. Next,
Model 2 adds the share of foreign capital in investment, as shown in the equation
(3.2). Estimations are performed for three country groups: OECD, non-OECD and for
all countries. I estimate the models by ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with
time dummy variables and then by least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator
including time- and country-specific dummy variables. Although both estimators are
biased8, the results provide the rough ranges of the true parameters. Model 1 also
serve as benchmark model, and I compare its results with prominent results obtained
by Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995).
Next, I modify the baseline equation to include the past values of the dependent
variable, similar to Caselli et al. (1996); Shioji (2001); Bond et al. (2010). The proper
estimator for the dynamic panel model specification is a two-step GMM estimator. The
estimator is asymptotically efficient and robust to panel-specific autocorrelation, dif-
ferent patterns of heteroskedasticity, and cross-country correlation (Bond et al., 2001).
It is a proper estimator for a short time-span (T=8) and a large cross-section (N=52
8Caselli et al. (1996), Shioji (2001) and Bond et al. (2010) argue that the existing empirical lit-
erature on economic convergence produces inconsistent and unreliable estimations. Two sources of
inconsistency are stressed. First is omitted variable bias due to mistreatment of country-specific fixed
effects. Seconds is endogeneity of explanatory variables due to the dynamic nature of the model.
Existing growth literature assumes that country effects are uncorrelated with other right-hand-side
variables and do not typically solve engodeneity issues. This paper attempts to address these concerns.
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for full sample, N=24 for OECD and N=28 for non-OECD samples ). Further, to pre-
vent any sort of cross-country and contemporaneous correlations, I remove universal
time-related shocks from errors by including time dummy variables.
Estimation results from OLS are reported in Table 3.2(a). In Model 1, the coeffi-
cients on the savings rate (si,t−τ ) are positive and statistically significant in non-OECD
countries and in the full sample. The coefficients on the effective depreciation rate
(nit + git + δ) are negative and statistically significant in the OECD countries and the
full sample. The coefficients have opposite effects in sign that signals that the joint-
hypothesis of the Solow model is confirmed and the aggregate production function is
Cobb-Douglas. The estimates are similar to those obtained by Mankiw et al. (1992).
In Models 2, the share of foreign capital appears positively related to output growth.
A 1% increase in the share leads to a 0.201% increase in income per effective labor in
OECD countries and a 0.337% increase in non-OECD countries. This result suggests
that developing countries that rely on the imported capital goods benefit more com-
pared to the developed countries in terms of output per worker growth. However, the
estimates are biased due to endogeneity and omitted variable issues.
Next, I estimate the three models with LSDV, including time and country-specific
dummy variables. The estimator corrects for individual effects bias, but does not solve
the endogeneity issue. The results are reported in Table 3.2(b). Here, the coefficients
on saving rate (β2) and effective depreciation rate (β3) are opposite in sign across
all models. Compared to the corresponding OLS coefficients, domestic factors a ex-
hibit weaker and insignificant relationship with output growth in non-OECD countries.
This bias may be due to the fact that country-specific dummy variables may capture
cross-country variation in the relatively stable effective depreciation rate. Overall, the
estimation results for Model 1 are consistent with those obtained by Islam (1995). The
coefficients on the share of foreign capital in Model 2 are positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% confidence level for non-OECD countries and the full sample. A 1%
increase in the share of foreign capital in investment leads to an approximate a 0.2 %
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increase in output per effective labor. The coefficient on the share of foreign capital in
investment appears to be negative in OECD countries. While the results are prone to
endogeneity bias, the estimator significantly improves the goodness of fit of the model,
raising the adjusted R-squared from 0.063 to 0.965 in the Model 2 of the full sample.
Further, I consider the dynamic model specification. The difference GMM trans-
forms equation (3.2) into a first-difference equation:
∆ ln(Yi,t) = β1∆ ln(Yi,t−5) + β2∆ ln(si,t) + β3∆ ln(nit + git ++δit) +
+β4∆(Kimp/I)i,t + δ) + ξt +∆ǫit (3.3)
where ξt is a year-specific constant, capturing factors common to all countries. First-
difference transformation removes country-specific fixed effects. I treat domestic factors
in the equation above as exogenous and lagged dependent variable along with the for-
eign factor as endogenous variables. Lagged levels of endogenous regressors are used as
instruments. The validity of instruments is determined by the consistency of param-
eter estimates and specification tests: the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions,
difference-in-Hansen tests for exogeneity of instrument subsets, and the Arellano-Bond
(AR) test for first- and second-order serial correlation in differences. These specifica-
tion tests indicate that the moment conditions are robust. The test for second-order
correlation in differences, AR(2) is important because it detects autocorrelation in lev-
els.
The results of GMM estimation and its specification tests are reported in Table
3.3. The Hansen and difference-Hansen statistics signal that errors are not serially
correlated. I find no evidence for serial correlation in levels, suggesting that fluctuations
in economic activity do not influence the results. The coefficient on lagged output has
the expected positive sign, and it strongly significant. The coefficients on ln(s) and
ln(nit+git+δ) are opposite in sign and statistically significant in most models. A closed
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version of the neoclassical model shows that the savings rate is positively associated
with the growth in output per worker, while population growth together with the
depreciation rate and the level of education attainment, have negative effect on output
per worker.
Model 2 indicates that physical capital inflows have positive and significant effects
on output growth in developing countries. A 1% increase in the share of foreign capital
goods in the domestic investment is associated with a 0.08% increase in output per
worker. The relationship between the two measures appear to be positive, however
insignificant and smaller in OECD countries compared to non-OECD countries. A 1
% increase in the share of foreign capital in investment leads to a 0.037% increase in
income per effective labor. This is not a surprising result given that developed countries
are large producers of capital goods and have less need to import.
The effect of domestic savings on output growth is slightly higher in industrial
countries relative to non-industrial. A 1% increase in the savings rate leads to a 0.419%
increase in output per worker in developed countries and a 0.409% increase in developing
countries. Across all countries, the effect of the foreign capital share in the domestic
investment is relatively similar to the effect of domestic savings on output growth.
While a 1% increase in the share of capital leads to a 0.176% increase in output per
worker, a 1% increase in domestic savings leads to a 0.197% increase in output per
worker.
Overall, across all countries, the empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the
share of foreign physical capital in domestic investment facilitates positive growth in
output per effective labor. Imported capital contributes significantly to the domestic
capital investment in developing countries. This conclusion, however, does not nec-
essary imply that we would observe an increase in imports of foreign capital goods
as country’s domestic investment rises, meaning that a nation industry can not easily
switch from producing consumption goods to capital goods.9
9To determine whether foreign capital goods and domestic investment are indeed substitutes and to
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3.5 Conclusion
Trade in physical capital is a conduit for technological advances and innovations
transfers, that have a potential to stimulate economic growth. This paper examines
the relationship between the share of foreign capital in domestic investment and the
growth of real gross domestic products per worker across 22 OECD and 28 non-OECD
countries. I use the data on bilateral trade in manufactures goods from UN Comtrade to
obtain the data on trade in physical capital. The data represents non-overlapping five-
year periods from 1970 to 2005. I augment Solow’s neoclassical growth model to include
international inflows of physical capital to study the determinants of growth in output
per capita. I employ OLS, LSDV, and the two-step difference GMM estimators and
find that the savings rate and the share of foreign capital in investment are significant
factors of real GDP per worker growth.
The results predict that the role of foreign capital in explaining per capita output
growth is higher in non-industrial countries (non-OECD). Investment in nonindustrial
countries is constrained by the lack of domestic capital, therefore countries rely on
manufacturing imports to obtain physical capital. Imports of capital goods contribute
to the economic development by providing production opportunities, ground for inno-
vations and technological advance. Policies should create the incentives for productive
physical capital accumulation through international trade in capital, as well as stim-
ulate technological advance and human capital growth in order to develop the appro-
priate capacity to absorb advanced technology from abroad. The results are robust to
alternative specifications, controlling for country-specific effects and time trends.
calculate the elasticity of substitution, a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function
is needed.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year: 1970
Real GDP per capita (PPP, 2005=100) 22104.13 15288.58 698.567 ( Burundi) 51363.61 (Switzerland)
Real GDP per capita growth (%) 9.655 0.968 6.549 (Burundi) 10.846 (Switzerland)
Capital Goods Imports (%, Investment) 0.296 0.182 0.026 (Japan) 1.005 (Uruguay)
Capital Goods Exports (%, Total Exports) 2.272 5.185 0.00004 (Ecuador) 28.340 (United States)
Net Capital Goods Trade (%, Investment) -0.209 0.200 -0.983 (Uruguay) 0.173 (United Kingdom)
Year: 2005
Real GDP per capita (PPP, 2005=100) 38143.62 27757.8 703.813 (Burundi) 93836.13 (Norway)
Real GDP per capita growth (%) 10.156 1.045 6.556 (Burundi) 11.449 (Norway)
Capital Goods Imports (%, I) 0.595 0.658 0.120 (Japan) 4.464 (Singapore)
Capital Goods Exports (%, Total Exports) 2 3.851 0.00003 (Panama) 19.055 (United States)
Net Capital Goods Trade (%, Investment) -0.175 0.285 -1.002 (Burundi) 0.926 (Singapore)
Table 3.2: Economic Growth and Physical Capital Inflows: OLS and LSDV
(a) OLS (ordinary least squares, time-fixed effects, robust standard errors)
OECD Non-OECD Full Sample
Dependent variable: ln(Yi,t) Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
ln(si,t) β1 0.034 0.211 0.700*** 0.543*** 0.741*** 0.585***
(std error) (0.133) (0.139) (0.110) (0.115) (0.132) (0.153)
ln(nit + git + δ) β2 -0.721*** -0.477** -0.224 -0.029 -1.093*** -0.830***
(std error) (0.225) (0.216) (0.222) (0.268) (0.231) (0.273)
(KImp/I)i,t β3 0.201** 0.337*** 0.110
(std error) (0.089) (0.114) (0.139)
Constant 8.807*** 9.612*** 9.586*** 9.723*** 8.325*** 8.766***
(0.499) (0.460) (0.507) (0.665) (0.526) (0.684)
Obs. 192 184 224 188 416 372
Adjusted R-sq. 0.285 0.256 0.180 0.182 0.116 0.063
(b) LSDV (least squares dummy variables, time- and country-fixed effects, robust standard
errors)
OECD Non-OECD Full Sample
Dependent variable: ln(Yi,t) Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
ln(si,t) β1 0.338*** 0.178*** 0.103* 0.137* 0.174*** 0.195***
(std error) (0.086) (0.060) (0.061) (0.073) (0.051) (0.060)
ln(nit + git + δ) β2 -0.201*** -0.107 -0.042 -0.038 -0.114 -0.113
(std error) (0.072) (0.068) (0.104) (0.118) (0.072) (0.074)
(KImp/I)i,t β3 -0.199* 0.289*** 0.224***
(std error) (0.104) (0.055) (0.046)
Constant 10.599*** 10.779*** 9.505*** 9.545*** 9.380*** 9.392***
(0.192) (0.151) (0.227) (0.246) (0.176) (0.168)
Obs. 192 184 224 188 416 372
Adjusted R-sq. 0.917 0.932 0.906 0.921 0.957 0.965
Chapter 3. Capital Goods Inflows and Economic Growth 66
Table 3.3: Economic Growth and Physical Capital Inflows: GMM
Panel GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991, time-fixed effects, robust standard errors)
OECD Non-OECD Full Sample
Dependent variable: ln(Yi,t) Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
ln(Yi,t) β1 0.732*** 0.627*** 0.775*** 0.615*** 0.495*** 0.320***
(std error) (0.033) (0.075) (0.059) (0.049) (0.091) (0.018)
ln(si,t) β2 0.419*** 0.409*** 0.226*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.197***
(std error) (0.033) (0.023) (0.071) (0.038) (0.040) (0.013)
ln(ni,tt+ gi,t+?i,t) β3 -0.184*** -0.140*** 0.020 -0.035 -0.069*** -0.057***
(std error) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.026) (0.011)
(Kimp/I)i,t β4 0.037 0.088*** 0.176***
(std error) (0.066) (0.017) (0.012)
Specification tests (p-values are in parenthesis)
Obs. 144 138 168 132 312 270
Countries 24 23 28 28 52 51
# of Instruments 19 20 19 28 23 44
Hansen J 13.68 10.65 11.78 20.02 16.07 30.93
(0.188) (0.386) (0.300) (0.332) (0.309) (0.619)
Diff. Hansen 11.57 7.87 10.03 5.96 8.47 7.95
(0.172) (0.446) (0.263) (0.652) (0.389) (0.439)
AR(1) -2.53 -1.58 -2.44 -1.56 -2.05 -0.60
(0.011) (0.115) (0.015) (0.119) (0.040) (0.546)
AR(2) 0.56 0.00 -0.16 0.11 0.15 0.71
(0.574) (0.996) (0.873) (0.910) (0.878) (0.476)
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Figure 3.1: Real GDP per worker and Capital Goods Imports in 1975
Figure 3.2: Real GDP per worker and Capital Goods Imports in 2005
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Figure 3.3: Share of Capital Goods Export in Total Capital Exports, G6 countries
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